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ABSTRACT 
 
The content of this paper revolves around the interrelation between science and 
philosophy. With a focus on Quantum Mechanics as the scientific frame of thought, we analyze 
the physicists’ ontological and epistemological view of reality in regards to this frame. 
This analysis is constructed in the time setting of the early to mid-20th century and 
involves a famous debate between the camps of Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr, forerunners in 
the field of physics at the time. We will present quantum theory, realism theory, and the pertinent 
physicist’s views in these regards by way of descriptive and constructive analysis. 
We conclude that science and philosophy are two subjects that constantly interact and 
that the important development of well-rounded philosophical constructions and scientific 
theories that coincide, or at least co-exist, with one another can only be achieved by practitioners 
of both. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Indholdet af denne rapport omhandler relationen mellem videnskab og filosofi. Med 
fokus på kvantemekanik som en videnskabelig tankeramme vil vi analysere de inkluderede 
fysikeres ontologiske og epistemologiske forståelser af virkelighed ud fra denne ramme.  
Denne analyse er konstrueret ud fra den tidslige periode fra det  tidlig til midt 20. 
århundrede, og involverer en berømt debat mellem Albert Einstein og Niels Bohr, forløberne 
inden for den tids fysik. Vi vil præsentere kvanteteori, realismeteori, og de relevante fysikeres 
forståelser af disse aspekter i form af deskriptiv og konstruktiv analyse.  
Vi konkluderer at videnskab, hermed ment kvantemekanik, og filosofi er to fagområder, 
som konstant indvirker på hinanden. Desuden mener vi, at den vigtige udvikling af velafrundede 
filosofiske konstruktioner og videnskabelige teorier, som stemmer overens, eller som i det 
mindste sameksisterer, kun kan opnås ved udfoldelsen af begge. 
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INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
'If quantum mechanics hasn't profoundly shocked you, you haven't understood it yet' - 
Niels Bohr (Web 1) 
 
Ever since quantum theory first surfaced in the beginning of the 20th century it has 
boggled everyone who's come across it. Introducing aspects such as non-locality and 
entanglement, wave-particle duality and uncertainty relations and probability amplitudes, 
quantum mechanics describes the micro level with laws that are in total contradiction with 
classical physics (Gribben, 1998: 322). 
The core of quantum mechanics is the mathematical formalism. Quantum physicists 
seldom disagree on the formalism, but they heavily disagree on the philosophical interpretations 
of what this formalism implies for reality and what knowledge science can provide about reality. 
Philosophically, quantum mechanics is interesting because interpretations of the formalism 
imply that reality as described by science might be very different from what we perceive at a 
macro level. 
Quantum theory is difficult to grasp for several reasons. For one, the language of 
quantum mechanics is mathematical formalism, which is not understandable by everybody. 
When translated into ordinary language quantum theory often leads to confusing simplifications 
and concepts. Add to that the counter-intuitive elements that contradict just about everything we 
perceive at the macro level and you are due to leave feeling further confused. It seems illogical 
that some laws can apply to the micro level, but not to the macro level.  
 
Theorists of quantum mechanics have been debating the philosophical interpretations 
since the moment quantum theory appeared. Most famous is perhaps the discussions between 
Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr, which unfolded in the 1930s and also included theories from 
other physicists such as Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schrödinger. The two sides of the debate 
strongly disagreed on whether quantum mechanics could be regarded as a 'complete' theory in 
describing reality. While Bohr's side said 'yes', Einstein's answer was a resounding 'no'. 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, quantum theory is open to a variety of philosophical 
interpretations. We are especially interested in which views of reality these interpretations entail. 
To us, this is the main interest because we believe that science is essential to our understanding 
of the world we live in, and essentially also to our understanding of what we can know about the 
world. Quantum mechanics does not offer an irrefutable answer to what reality is and what we 
can know about it, so answering such questions is a matter of philosophical views and 
arguments, of course logically connected with the experimental results. We are curious about 
how leading physicists, such as Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr, in the time of the development of 
quantum mechanics, interpreted the theory and thus revealed different views of reality and what 
we can know about it. Also, we are curious as to how these disagreements are possible, why 
quantum mechanics is so hard to understand philosophically, and how these problems of 
understanding can be said to be conceptual. As a result of this curiosity, our problem statement in 
the paper at hand goes as follows:   
 
 
How do the interpretations of quantum mechanics in the Einstein-Bohr debate offer 
philosophical views of reality, and which conceptual problems can be said to underpin 
their philosophical disagreements?  
 
It is important to mention that this problem statement includes several simplifications and 
hidden nuances, which we will attempt to uncover and explain in the next section, as to give a 
fuller and more complex understanding of what the aim, expectations, and limits of the paper are. 
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DELIMITATION 
 
Quantum mechanics is an immense scientific field to explore, and gaining a complete 
understanding of the physics and math involved would be an over ambitious task for a paper of 
this kind. The paper at hand will thus show that it is not written by physicists, though, we have 
diligently tried to explain these deep physical theories, simply. With this in mind, it should also 
be stated that the main focus of this paper is mainly philosophical and not physical. Even so, we 
have found it necessary to build a theoretical foundation about quantum mechanics, in order to 
be able to make well founded claims about the philosophical implications of different quantum 
mechanical interpretations. It is not, however, meant to be a full guide to the science of quantum 
mechanics, but an introduction to the theories and concepts needed to construct a meaningful 
philosophical discussion. We will briefly mention parts of the fundamental mathematical 
formalism of quantum theory, but we will restrict ourselves from going into unneeded details. 
We are fully aware that the debate about interpretations of quantum mechanics is a 
diamond with numerous facets, and we need not to engage in all of them. Thus we have chosen 
some of the most prominent representatives of quantum theory from a time when quantum 
mechanics was still 'new'. Our main concern will be the so called Einstein-Bohr debate, which in 
this case entails on one side, among others, Niels Bohr and the Copenhagen interpretation and on 
the other side Einstein and companies’ critique of this. Naming it the Einstein-Bohr debate is a 
simplification, since the main contribution on the Einstein side will be the EPR-paper, and since 
the 'Bohr side' also consists of Heisenberg and Schrödinger and the main features of the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is in the name of simplicity that we will be 
referring to this as the Einstein-Bohr debate, even though we are aware that this also entails a 
generalization of opinions. We are,  however, content with such a generalization to some extent, 
since, as previously mentioned, this paper is concerned with philosophy more than quantum 
mechanics, and in that perspective the included quantum theory will be presented as a well-
informed 'case' upon which the philosophical analysis and discussion will be performed. Going 
into the analysis and discussion the views of Bohr, Heisenberg and Schrödinger will gradually be 
merged into one philosophical stance, as will Einstein's, for the sake of making a philosophical 
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discussion about reality and what we can know about reality. Thus, the included physicist will 
initially be highly visible and connected to their views, but will gradually be filtered away until 
all we are left with are their philosophical views. 
Going into theory of scientific realism and anti-realism, it comes to our attention that this 
also is a debate with many nuances and definitions. We have chosen some, aware of excluding 
many others, only in order to construct a philosophical analytical tool, with which we hope to 
accentuate the differences and similarities in the included philosophical views on quantum 
mechanics in regard to reality. 
In the final discussion we will introduce conceptualization as a problem in understanding 
quantum mechanics. We will not introduce immense theory of conceptualization in our theory 
section, but apply it as an analytic tool and point of discussion later on. We will, however, when 
applying it, give a brief description of the relevant aspects of conceptualization, in order to 
provide a meaningful discussion of the difficulties involved with understanding quantum 
mechanics from a philosophical point of view.    
In the following section we will explain a bit further some of the paper’s most frequently 
used terms, as to clarify the meaning by which we apply them and thus prevent ambiguities and 
misunderstandings.   
 
CLARIFICATION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
 
In the section at hand we will give a brief introduction to some of the central terms and 
concepts used in the paper, to create an understanding of the specific meaning we attach to them, 
since we know that a great many of them are open to more than one interpretation. 
 
Quantum mechanics, quantum theory and quantum physics 
In this paper we will often be using terms such as quantum mechanics, quantum theory, 
and quantum physics. We are using these three expressions to account for the same thing, 
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namely the scientific development away from Newtonian mechanics in the beginning of the 20th 
century. We refer to this science as dealing with the quantum, or micro, level of things 
(Blackburn, 2008: 302). Also, we are mostly referring to specific interpretations of quantum 
mechanics, such as those presented by Albert Einstein and by the Copenhagen interpretation.   
 
The Einstein-Bohr debate 
As we mentioned in the delimitation we will be using the term, the Einstein-Bohr debate, 
as a simplification for a multi participant debate. As such, the 'Einstein side' is mainly founded in 
the EPR-paper, which Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen co-authored, but we will use it only to 
represent Einstein's view on quantum mechanics, and we will thus not be concerned with 
Podolsky and Rosen. The 'Bohr side' of the debate also includes theory of Werner Heisenberg 
and Erwin Schrödinger, but these will serve as support for Bohr's views as presented in the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. As a result, the Einstein-Bohr debate will 
roughly be generalized to two views on the interpretation of quantum mechanics.  
 
Reality and real 
When we use terms such as reality or real and do not attach the specific views of one of 
our included theorists, we are using them as 'primitive terms'. That is to say the layperson 
understanding of real as something that exists, without connotations of any philosophical 
interpretation of this. Reality should be understood as 'physical reality', referring to the existence 
of an external world, and again without any philosophical view attached to it. 
It is important to mention that when talking about the physicists' views on reality, we are 
referring to reality on the quantum level, even though we further on talk about reality 'as a 
whole', including both micro and macro levels. This distinction, subtle as it may be, is important 
to avoid misinterpretations of the views of the included physicists. 
 
Epistemology, ontology and semantics 
When mentioning epistemology, we are referring to theory of knowledge, which includes 
the origin and limitation of this (Blackburn, 2008: 118). We will mainly be concerned with the 
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epistemology of reality, i.e. what we can know about reality and how we can gain knowledge 
about reality.  
Ontology is used in the meaning of theory of being, of what exists (Blackburn, 2008: 
260). It will mainly be applied in relation to reality, i.e. what is reality and what can be said to be 
real.  
We mentioned semantics in the sense of theory of signs, specifically the relation of signs 
to the objects they refer to (Blackburn, 2008: 333). Again the main focus is reality, and in this 
case if what we say is real actually has a connection to real objects.     
 
Observation, measurement and experiment 
The terms observation, measurement and experiment are terms frequently used in this 
paper. Observation does not necessarily entail a conscious observer, but instead it implies a 
detection or monitoring of something, be it done by a conscious or non-conscious observer (Web 
2). 
Measurement is used in the sense of an experimental conduct a size, degree or value of 
something is detected using instruments (Web 3). 
Experiment is used to describe the scientific procedure undertaken to discover, test or 
demonstrate something (Web 4). 
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THEORY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS IN 
PHYSICS 
 
 
WHAT IS QUANTUM MECHANICS? 
 
Giving a brief definition of quantum mechanics is like giving a brief definition of science 
- it cannot be done briefly without leaving out a lot of significant details and nuances. However, 
in the following we seek to describe a broad picture of quantum mechanics to give an impression 
of how it is dealt with in this paper. 
Quantum mechanics is usually equivalent to the term 'quantum physics'. It is generally 
described as laws of mechanics that apply to the micro or quantum world, oppositely to the 
macro world - our 'everyday world'. Quantum mechanics can be thought of as a contrast to 
classical mechanics as featured in Newtonian physics, though formulations of quantum theory 
does include classical mechanics (Gribbin, 1998: 321). 
Quantum mechanics work on a scale 'invisible' to human eyes - on the level of atoms. At 
this level, some physical processes occur discontinuously and in so called 'quantum leaps'. These 
leaps happen at such a small scale, given by the Planck constant, that the enormous amount of 
quantum leaps gives us the impression of a continuous macro world. The theory of quantum 
leaps is just one of the peculiar elements of quantum theory. Some mind boggling aspects are, 
among others, that the quantum world operates by laws of chance and non-locality, introducing 
elements of randomness and 'entanglement' across great distances to the understanding of the 
quantum world. But, despite these seemingly strange theories of quantum mechanics, experiment 
after experiment shows that is works. Quantum mechanics is a highly successful theory that has 
enabled a lot of the technology that society depends on today (Gribbin, 1998: 321-322). Things 
like laser technology, nuclear energy and all of computer technology are examples of the results 
of practical quantum mechanics. Even the understanding of DNA was achieved by applying 
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quantum mechanics to biology. One could say that quantum mechanics is so successful and so 
applicable because it is the most fundamental in all of science (Gribbin, 1998: 323-324). 
In this paper we will not be focusing on the practical applications of quantum mechanics, 
but on selected theories relevant to a discussion of philosophical concepts of realism and anti-
realism that interpretations of quantum mechanics entail - in our case mainly the interpretations 
of Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein. 
In the following section we shall briefly go over significant discoveries and theorists in 
the development of quantum mechanics, in order to give deeper understanding of the historical 
aspects leading up to the Einstein-Bohr debate. 
 
THE HISTORY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS 
 
Establishing the beginning of quantum mechanics is a matter of assessment. It grew out 
of a long history of science, as do most scientific theories, and the beginning is therefore not to 
be pinpointed precisely. In the following section we will attempt to give an overview of some of 
the important discoveries and theorists involved with the development of quantum theory, 
leading up to the time of the Einstein-Bohr debate. Some elements will be briefly elaborated on, 
while others will only be mentioned. The point of the following section is to give a fairly brief 
introduction to the development of quantum theory, relevant to this paper. 
A topic of much discussion in science has long been the consistency of light. Around 
1704 Isaac Newton (1642-1727) stated that light consists of corpuscles like tiny cannon balls 
(Gribbin, 1998: 251-252). Another great physicist of the time, Christopher Huygens (1629-1695) 
didn't agree, and instead claimed that light is made of waves. Newton's reputation won him the 
war and his theory came to be accepted until the work of physicists Thomas Young (1773-1829) 
and Augustin Fresnel (1788-1827) proved that light is waves, in the double slit experiment 
(Gribbin, 1998: 181-182). Another element of debate in science in the eighteen hundreds was the 
thermo dynamical issue of the laws by which so called black bodies emit energy in the form of 
radiation. Looking into the problem, the German physicist Max Planck (1858-1947) eventually 
proposed that the radiation isn't emitted continuously, but in packets of energy thought of as 
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quanta - he proposed that radiation from black bodies is quantified (Gribbin, 1998: 44). Planck's 
law states that the radiation energy, E, is the product of the constant, h, and the frequency, f, of 
the radiation. The frequency and energy were well known quantities at the time, but the constant 
h was not. The 14th of December 1900 can, in a sense, be said to mark the beginning of quantum 
theory. At that date Planck presented his law of radiation and his constant, h, to the German 
Physical Society. This represents a break with classical physics, since it proves that nature 
proceeds by leaps, and not in a continuous process. The introduction of what would be known as 
Planck's constant was a crucial step towards quantum theory, and it's an element in many 
quantum mechanical calculations such as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle (Gribbin, 1998: 284-
286). 
In 1905 Albert Einstein applies Planck's constant and suggests the actual existence of 
light quanta, and he does so in explaining the photoelectric effect (Gribbin, 1998: 284). In 
opposition to previous beliefs about light being an electromagnetic wave, he suggests that it 
instead can be described as a particle-like quanta - what we now know as photons (Gribbin, 
1998: 504). 
Planck's constant was involved in another great discovery in 1913 - namely that of 
Danish physicist, Niels Bohr (1885-1962). Bohr wrote off Rutherford's atomic model of 1911 
with a nucleus and a cloud of electrons, which had grave problems with explaining the 
continuous and stable orbiting of the electrons. Bohr thus combined the planetary orbits of the 
electrons circling the nucleus with Planck's constant to formulate the theory of an atom with 
stable orbits, which electrons could 'jump' between, emitting or absorbing quanta of energy 
(Gribbin, 1998: 52-53). This jump came to be known as the quantum leap and was one of the 
first great mysteries of quantum theory, since it describes a discontinuous transition between 
quantum states - the leap happens instantaneous and apparently randomly (Gribbin, 1998: 320). 
Bohr's theory implied that the electron has a particle-like nature. So the debate raged - was the 
electron a particle or a wave? In 1924 the French physicist Louis de Broglie (1892-1987) 
suggested a surprising answer - it is both. De Broglie thus introduced the idea that all material 
particles, such as electrons, can be described as waves, which came to form one of the founding 
pillars of quantum mechanics - wave-particle duality (Gribbin, 1998: 61-62).  
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The works of de Broglie caught Einstein's attention, and through him the Austrian 
physicist, Erwin Schrödinger (1887-1961), encountered the wave theory of the electron, which 
led him to develop the wave mechanics formulation of quantum mechanics in 1926. This 
suggests that the electron has a wave-like nature and that it doesn't exist in one point of space or 
time - it exists in all of space and time (Gribbin, 1998: 426-427). Heisenberg 'merges' his own 
theories and Bohr’s with Schrödinger's by introducing his uncertainty principle in 1927. This 
states that uncertainty is intrinsically associated with conjugated variables, such as position and 
momentum, in the quantum world - it is fundamentally impossible to measure the position and 
the momentum of a particle at the same time with accuracy. The more you know about one, the 
less you know about the other. This made it possible to merge Schrödinger's theory with the 
theories of Bohr and Heisenberg, to give a new quantum theory. The electron was then presented 
as a particle, but with uncertainty to where it is. The probability of finding it at any given point is 
given by the Schrödinger wave (Gribbin, 1998: 427-428). 
This merger led Niels Bohr, in 1927, to present what would become known as the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, holding the understanding of the electron as 
just explained (Gribbin, 1998: 516-518). The Copenhagen interpretation quickly took the stage 
as the 'standard' explanation of the quantum world, but not without opponents. Other 
interpretations surfaced and many physicists found the Copenhagen interpretation, and quantum 
theory in general, unsatisfactory in different ways (Gribbin, 1998: 87-88). Einstein was one of 
the physicists that objected to elements of quantum theory, arguing in a famous paper of 1935, 
accompanied by Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, that quantum mechanics is incomplete in 
describing reality by the nature of the wave function (Gribbin, 1998: 126-127). 
The debate between Einstein and Bohr sprang out of this development and evolved 
around the interpretation of quantum mechanical results. They seemingly didn't disagree about 
the formalism of quantum mechanics, but instead about the philosophical concepts that quantum 
theory entails. 
In the next sections we will give a description of relevant theories of Bohr, Heisenberg, 
Schrödinger and Einstein to construct the quantum theoretical framework of our philosophical 
discussion of concepts of realism and anti-realism in quantum mechanics. But first, we will 
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present some information on the concept of states, with a very important experiment to follow 
that is a central the point of departure in the development of Quantum Mechanics.  
     
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM STATES 
 
Now that we have seen the early developments of quantum mechanics, starting at the 
wave-particle debate and leading up to the idea of wave-particle duality, we are looking into the 
differences between ‘states’. There lies a major difference within the distinction between what 
one might call ‘classical states’, within Newtonian physics, and ‘quantum states’, the quantum 
mechanical definition. In the section at hand we will briefly go into the differences between 
classical states and quantum mechanical states. This explanation is perhaps mostly connected 
with the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanical states, since this is the quantum 
interpretation that this paper deals with in relation to Einstein's criticism of quantum mechanics. 
Thus let us first look at what these differences in defining the states are. 
             Let us take for example a system with one degree of freedom, such as a pendulum. In 
terms of a classical system, we can say that at any given moment, if we know the momentum 
(px) of the pendulum, we can determine the position of the pendulum. This can also be said if we 
have the position (x) of the pendulum at two given moments (t), we can calculate the momentum 
(px). We can say that this system is determined because a set of values allows us to predict the 
outcome of the third variable. What lies at the basis of this ‘determination’ is the fact that for px, 
we automatically have a corresponding value x. Therefore (px , x) holds because, once we 
measure on position x, we can know its specific momentum px. Classical systems have 
properties, which can be described by 'real' numbers assigned to the states of the system. As 
such, the state of a classical system can be known once we obtain these numbers (Auyang, 1995: 
64). In other words, every observable has a specific numerical value corresponding to that state. 
The term ‘observable’ therefore gives a good idea of how we are to look at these phenomena. 
Not only are these values actually the thing we measure, they are corresponding to the numerical 
value we assign to them. One might say that it does a sufficient job at understanding how the 
world works at a macro scale. Unfortunately, maybe, for quantum mechanics the difference 
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between pendulum and an electron is rather vast and therefore calls for another approach or 
measurement. 
             Classically the state can be seen as a set of variables, but it's not so in quantum 
mechanics. In quantum mechanics the state is described by the wave function, which defines an 
amplitude of probability. This is described by Schrödinger's wave function (Gribbin, 1998: 375), 
which we will describe further in the Schrödinger section. 
If we have a quantum mechanical pendulum, the wave function represents the state of the 
system as a function of the position and momentum. The position and momentum are not 
functions representing observables, as in classical, but operators, which are functions operating 
on the wave function, creating new wave functions known as eigenfunction. From the 
eigenfunction we get a specific quantum value, known as the eigenvalue (Gribbin, 1998: 115). 
Also, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which we will explain further later on, entails that the 
two operators are conjugated and so we cannot know them both fully. If we measure the 
momentum of a quantum mechanical pendulum, we cannot know its position, and if we measure 
the position we cannot know the momentum. Once we measure one, for example the position, 
the wave function collapses, thereby determining the specific eigenvalue by which we know the 
position of the particle and its corresponding wave function. In general, therefore, it follows that 
the new wave function thus consists of any given probable eigenvalue and wave function, and is 
only determined to a specific operator once we interfere through measurement. But is does seem 
strange that we can measure both the momentum and the position of a classical pendulum 
simultaneously, but not that of an electron. Basic logic would say that since classical pendulums 
and everything else in our macro world consist of atoms, and thus also electrons, one should be 
able to simultaneously define the momentum and position of an electron. The reason why we 
don't experience all these uncertainties is because of the difference in the dimensions of the 
systems. In the macro world we have large dimensions of length, mass, temperature, momentum 
and so on. These are of considerable size compared to the dimensions in the micro world, and so 
what we are experiencing on the macro scale are averages, in which the uncertainties does not 
appear to us. As such, there is not a distinct line between the micro scale and the macro, but it is 
more of a gradation.  
Another seemingly strange aspect of quantum states and quantum mechanical formalism 
is what is known as superposition of states. It is a mixture of states, which makes it impossible to 
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specify the physical characteristics of a quantum entity. As an example one can think of the spin 
of a particle, which can be up or down, classically. In quantum mechanics, a particle in a 
superposition of states cannot be said to have a spin either up or down, but a mixture of both. 
One could say that the particle has a spin both up and down until it's measured, by which it 
settles into a definite state of either up or down. Ones it is no longer measured, the particle again 
dissolves into a superposition of states. This superposition of states applies to all quantum 
properties and is thus way more complicated than this example shows (Gribbin, 1998: 391). 
Having looked into some of the differences between classical and quantum mechanical 
states, in the next section we will introduce a well-known experiment within quantum 
mechanics, namely the double-slit experiment. This experiment played a central role in 
discussions of the interpretation on quantum mechanics - and in the Einstein-Bohr debate as 
well. 
 
THE DOUBLE-SLIT EXPERIMENT  
 
The world of quantum physics is one that brings about many mysteries, but how was this 
world first discovered, and, put to trial? The central experiment that has been used to explain and 
explore the phenomenon of quantum mechanics is one that was first conducted in the 1800s by 
Thomas Young, an English born physicist. The double slit experiment, sometimes called 
Young’s experiment, first suggested that light moved as a wave and not, as some classical 
physics believed, as a particle. The experiment was later elaborated upon by a physicist named 
Claus Jönsson (1930-) in Berlin-Charlottenburg, who first conducted the experiment with 
electrons and reinforced the interference pattern displayed by electrons which began to reveal to 
us the way in which particles act in quantum systems (Web 5). 
In the lectures by Richard Feynman, an American theoretical physicist (1918–1988), we 
find a construction and explanation of the experiment that helps enrich our understanding of the 
model. In this section we will present the experiment and the ideas it brings forward, so as to 
construct as simple an understanding as possible in regards to the fundamentals of quantum 
mechanics. Because the common understanding of physics is still predominantly understood in 
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the classical paradigm we will build the models, as does Feynman, starting from the classical and 
moving toward the quantum. 
The double slit experiment was first conducted using light, which lead to the discovery of 
light as a wave and not as a particle, but because light itself is not seen by humans in wave form, 
and for the sake of linearity in our explanation, we will construct the first part of our ‘thought’ 
experiment using something more particle like and move on to something seen in wave picture, a 
water wave. For the entirety of our experiment, no matter the scenario explored, the initial set up 
of the experiment will be the same. Imagine if you will, a source (it will produce all particles, 
waves, or electrons we use) set up facing an impervious material in which two vertical slits, 𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑡1 
and 𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑡2, running parallel to each other, are cut out. These two slits can, at any time, be 
purposefully closed to effect the data we are able to collect.  Behind these two slits is another 
material, a back stop, with a center (x) directly in between the two slits, that registers and collects 
data on anything that strikes it (for our experiment, and for the sake of simplicity, we will do 
away with Feynman’s moveable detector). This set up will be the base line in all experiments to 
come (Feynman, 1963: 37.2). 
Ok, let us begin. With the first experiment we will fire, one at a time, at the slits, some 
bullets. Assuming they do not break or split in any way, they will end up at the backstop and be 
registered as a tick of data. The gun fires randomly at the material and some of the bullets find 
the free space offered by the slits. Already in our mind we can “see” what will happen. One 
would assume that bullets will create a line like pattern of holes, albeit with some strays that may 
have bounced off the inside of the slits, directly behind the two slits. This is, in fact, what does 
happen (see fig.1). From this we can graph the probability of where a bullet reaching the 
backstop will land in relation to the center (x), first by counting the 
amount of bullets fired and then by counting the amount of bullets 
that reached the backstop, a ratio. We will label the probability 𝑃, 
and for this experiment we then have the probability line 𝑝12, the 
collective probability of how close to center (x) the bullets that reach the backstop by passing 
through hole 1 and 2 will be (fig.1).  If we were then to close one of the slits, we could assume 
that only one line like pattern of holes would arise, and again we would be correct. For hole 1 
this is labeled 𝑃1, and 𝑃2 for hole 2 being open (again, fig.1). Simple right? 
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So, now that we have ran the experiment using particles, let us move on to using waves, 
water waves to be precise. The setup is the same, except now our experiment is in a pool of 
water and the source is creating waves. Let us start by closing one of the slits and creating a 
wave. Imagine the wave reaching the slit, from this open slit a new wave would arise. This wave 
would radiate outward until it hit the backstop and the intensity (or amplitude, the mean squared 
height ([ℎ̂ ]2)) would be recorded. If the new source was from 𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑡1, we would seemingly 
reproduce the probability line from the previous experiment. 𝑃1 and 𝐼1 would look the same, this 
would be the same for just opening 𝐼2 as compared to 𝑃2 as well. Now, let us open both holes. In 
this instance the initial source wave has split into two waves with new sources at the slits. These 
waves would radiate out and interfere with each other, denoted by ℎ 𝑒𝑖𝜔𝑡, which would create 
different wave amplitudes. When they join and grow, this is called constructive interference. 
When they cancel each other out, this is called destructive 
interference. These together create an interference pattern that reaches 
the backstop and is registered as many peaks, the strongest being in 
the center (x) and receding in intensity the further from center they are 
(fig. 2). To then map 𝐼12 as a line is now a bit more difficult, suffice it to say we simply can’t add 
𝐼1 and 𝐼2 to get 𝐼12 as we did with 𝑃. The exact equation looks something like this 𝐼12 =
[ℎ1 + ℎ2 ]
2 (fig. 2). This maps out a graph that looks just as our data collected from the backstop, 
the highest peak being in the center (x) and receding in intensity as they get further from the 
center. Even though it becomes a bit more complex, the classical systems still suffice in 
explaining the actions of these types of waves (Feynman, 1963: 37.3). But, to complicate 
matters, now let us look at how the quantum systems react in the same experiment. 
Once again, we run the same set up, no water, with electrons emitting from the source, 
one at a time, at random trajectories, just as in the bullet experiment. We will start off by closing 
one of the slits. Just as with the bullet experiment we get a line like pattern of holes behind the 
slit. The electrons appear as dots in the backstop. We will label those electrons passing through 
𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑡1, 𝑃1 and map the line, the same for 𝑃2 (fig. 3). Here we observe 
what we believe to be particle like behavior. No problem, right? Now 
let us open both slits and see what results we get. Strangely, the 
electrons no longer continue to arrive at the backstop in two line like 
patterns. What we obtain from the backstop data looks more like many line like patterns of dots, 
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an interference pattern, like that of waves. This is a representation of a wave function (fig. 3). 
Remember, it is only one electron firing a time, so if the electron actually moves as a wave, that 
would have to mean that it interferes with itself. But how can the electron be measured as a 
particle but travel as a wave? How can a particle logically interfere with itself? This is one of the 
big mysteries of quantum mechanics, it brings about one of the central concepts of quantum 
mechanics called wave particle duality, and it is seemingly irrefutable, since experiments 
confirm it over and over again. Physicists have even constructed mathematical equations to 
explain it. Using the complex number, 𝛷 phi, we will attribute it to each slit as 𝑃1 = [𝛷1]
1 (like 
the wave amplitude) and 𝑃2 = [𝛷2]
2. Thus the equation for 𝑃12 becomes 𝑃12 = [𝛷1 + 𝛷2 ]
2 (fig. 
3). In logical mathematical terms, the concept stands. This equation is the bases of the 
probability amplitude of a system (Feynman, 1963: 37.5). Regardless of whether you understand 
the equations, the experiments data still retains its footing, and you can undoubtable see why this 
would create a problem for physicists trying to explain the nature of reality. 
        To try to overcome this problem, another experiment was conducted by Feynman. Given 
the confusing data from the previous experiment, physicist wanted to see if 
the path of the electron was somehow strange, irrational, or complex. Did 
the electron split? Did it come through one hole, loop through the second, 
any number of times, and then travel toward the backstop? This experiment 
has the same set up as the others, but adds one important thing. That thing is a tool of 
measurement, in this case a light source, set up in between the two slits. The purpose of this 
light, which is always on, is that a flash will be emitted from the electron passing though the light 
waves when it detects a particle entering from either 𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑡1 or 𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑡2. This would then be registered 
by, let us say a camera for simplicity, at either position 𝐷1  or 𝐷2  (fig. 4). Ok, let us run the 
experiment. Does it work? Does it flash when a particle enters from either 𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑡1 or 𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑡2? Yes. In 
fact it even registers that the electron only enters through one side and does not loop around or 
move in an irrational manner. Terrific, but what have we really found out? If we look to the 
backstop to see what data has been registered, what do you think we see? The pattern that we see 
is now that of a particle probability line, the same results we got with the bullet experiment. That 
means no interference. Line 𝐷1 and line 𝐷2 now equal 𝐷12. But what happened to the wave like 
behavior of the electron that was registered before? Did we conduct the experiment wrong? Let 
us turn off the detection apparatus (light source), the only thing different in this experiment, and 
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see. With this run of the experiment the wave function of the electron 𝑃12 is restored. What does 
this mean then? Well, it must have something to do with the detection apparatus. The light 
source must have disturbed the electron in some way as to make it act like a particle. This is what 
is called a collapse of the wave function. The disturbance changed the nature of the electron from 
that of wave to that of a particle, hence wave particle duality (Feynman, 1963: 37.6). 
        While we can now follow the evolution of quantum mechanics through the double slit 
experiment, the end result of these experiments might be more problematic than comforting. It 
might not mean anything at all to the common reader. In the broad picture of things it is hard to 
find any applicability of these concepts to daily life or even philosophy in general. From a 
physics perspective probably all physicists agree that electron act sometimes like a wave and 
sometimes like a particle, but they don’t all agree on what this means. In the next section we will 
introduce some of the theory of Danish physicist, Niels Bohr, and his interpretation of this 
experiment. 
 
NIELS BOHR 
 
“[…] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen have presented arguments which lead them 
to answer the question at issue in the negative” (Bohr, 1935: 696). 
 
The question at issue Niels Bohr is addressing here is that of the completeness of 
quantum mechanics and its description of physical reality. To him, the EPR-paper gave a 
negative answer to the question of quantum mechanics. Without elaborating on the philosophical 
debate that underlies the physics at work here, we shall now focus on the theory as presented by 
the teachings of Niels Bohr. As one of the leading scientist in the field of quantum mechanics, 
Bohr developed the Copenhagen interpretation to describe the behavior of quantum particles, as 
well as the problems that arise with interpreting experimental findings within the double-slit 
experiment, used to show the particle-wave duality. His theory argued in favor of a more positive 
answer to the debate than that of Einstein, who held, unlike Bohr, that quantum mechanics was 
incomplete (Gribbin, 1998: 51). 
The Copenhagen interpretation got its name from the capital of Denmark, where Bohr 
and his colleagues performed most of their work. The interpretation has never formally been 
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explained in a coherent fashion by Bohr, but instead appears as a pragmatic approach to physics. 
It's a bundle of ideas set to explain quantum mechanics in a way that any competent physicist can 
follow (Gribbin, 1998: 88). 
An essential part of the Copenhagen interpretation is the importance of experiments in 
the attempt to know anything about the quantum world. Bohr found that the only way we can 
measure anything is to disturb the quantum world, probing it with our instruments. As such, 
measurement plays a vital role in what we can know (Gribbin, 1998: 88). 
But the Copenhagen interpretation of course wasn't all Bohr - it was, as mentioned before, a 
collection of ideas. One of these ideas was provided for by Heisenberg, namely the uncertainty 
principle. Bohr himself stresses the effect of this principle:     
    
“it is a well-known feature of the present formalism of quantum mechanics that it is never 
possible, in the description of the state of a mechanical system, to attach definite values 
to both of two canonically conjugate variables […]” (Bohr, 1935: 696). 
 
As such, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is included in the interpretation - we will 
explain this principle further in the Heisenberg section. Another central idea in the Copenhagen 
interpretation is what Bohr called complementarity, which is the way quantum entities have 
attributes of both a particle and a wave. The Schrödinger's wave equation, the description of how 
the wave function develops over time, is also included. While Schrödinger wanted to give a 
classical description, one that develops over space and time, Bohr disagreed and reinforced 
complementarity because the classical ‘space and time’ concept does not translate into quantum 
physics. All the possible wave functions exist in a superposition of states until a measurement is 
made, by which the wave function collapses and forces the entity into one state (Gribbin, 1998: 
88-89).    
The idea of uncertainty goes against the classical formalism (the big difference is that we 
cannot know them simultaneously) in which the criteria for a complete description of physical 
reality are based on correspondence between the theory and the observation. For classical 
mechanics this was indeed the case that for a given measurement had a given result, but for Bohr 
the role of the observer became more prominent. Supported by Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle it became clear that in the description of quantum systems, experimental conditions 
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were defining for the outcome of the experiment (Krips, 2013). No longer did it seem that 
properties of a particle as Px and x were predictable and known, but it had proven that we could 
not know the values of these properties simultaneously. 
What was new in Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation was that physicists now ought to 
look for, what he called “individuality” (Bohr, 1935: 697), something unknown to classical 
mechanics. Particles no longer should be measured as if they were classical systems with set 
outcomes, but instead they should be seen as having values of their own, dependent upon us, the 
observer, through interference with the system in our usage of measuring tools. For this, Bohr 
uses two different experimental setups that clearly show the problems resulting from a particular 
experimental conduct. In experiment I, he introduces a version of the double-slit experiment 
where the slits are a fixed diaphragm so that, once a particle passes through, the momentum of 
that particle is not transferred to the diaphragm. In experimental setup II, he introduces the 
diaphragm as an unfixed slit, receptive for any given momentum from the particle translating in 
an equal transfer of momentum to the diaphragm. For experiment I it leads to the conclusion that 
the transferred momentum will remain unknown to us, but experiment II lets us know the 
momentum of the particle thanks to the conservation of energy between the colliding diaphragm 
and the particle. The conclusion drawn from these two experiments is the following: 
 
“The principal difference between the two experimental arrangements under 
consideration is, however, that in the arrangement suited for the control of the 
momentum of the first diaphragm, this body can no longer be used as a measuring 
instrument for the same purpose as in the previous case, but must, as regards its position 
relative to the rest of the apparatus, be treated, like the particle traversing the slit, as an 
object of  investigation, in the sense that the quantum mechanical uncertainty relations 
regarding its position and momentum must be taken explicitly into account.” (Bohr, 
1935: 698) 
         
So it follows that, even as the momentum can be known to us through an interference with the 
diaphragm, it gives us no further knowledge about the position of the particle.  
The Copenhagen interpretation of the double slit experiment is that the electron leaving 
the electron gun immediately dissolves into various overlapping probability waves - a 
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superposition of states, with a set of probabilities about the position of the electron. These waves 
pass through both slits and interfere, creating a new superposition of states, carrying information 
about the arrangement of the two slits. When the detector screen measures the quantum system, 
the measurement causes the wave function of the superposition of states to collapse and the 
electron to become a particle at a definite point. As soon as the measurement has been made, the 
electron begins to resolve yet again, reaching a superposition of states with another set of 
probabilities. Because of this understanding of the double slit experiment, it makes no sense to 
ask about the state of quantum entities when we are not measuring them, since they then exist in 
a superposition of states (Gribbin, 1998: 90).    
Bohr, and Heisenberg to certain extent as well, thought the mathematics behind quantum 
mechanics led to the notion that, rather than having a corresponding value for every variable of a 
particle, these particularities of quantum theory were just showing us the boundaries of 
experimental conduct. Therefor the debate about the completeness of quantum theory was not a 
matter of an incomplete science for Bohr, but much more a sign of our limitation to get full 
knowledge of a phenomenon through experiments (Bohr, 1935: 699). The science of classical 
physics, wherein all values are conjugated and knowable, was no longer a valid assumption 
within quantum mechanics. Instead quantum mechanics should seek complementarity in a 
different way. Bohr saw this complementary model reoccurring by conducting the experiments 
in a setting wherein one variable, momentum or position, should be examined (Bohr, 1935: 700). 
By combining a set of data, one could then arrive at a complementary science where statistics 
could offer an average of the description of the wave function. The point taken by Bohr in this 
argument is that one should ‘dare to’ discriminate, because only part of the system can be 
known, within a quantum mechanical experiment to get the results sought after. this gives 
experimenters a degree of freedom in choosing which observable they define, thereby allowing 
the option to gain full understanding about a specific variable, understandable in a classical 
physics model (Bohr, 1935: 701). 
As we have mentioned previously, Bohr was not the only brain behind the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Another crucial contribution was made by his colleague, 
Werner Heisenberg, which will become evident in the next section. 
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WERNER HEISENBERG 
 
Werner Heisenberg, a German physicist that played a major role in the early 
developments of the quantum mechanical model, was already mentioned in relation to the earlier 
discussed Bohr’s Copenhagen Interpretation. In this section we will explain a bit further about 
his uncertainty principle in order to give a deeper understanding of the Copenhagen 
interpretation and the 'Bohr side' of the debate that this paper is concerned with. We will thus 
restrict ourselves from going into the specific details of Heisenberg's theory, as he is intended to 
be a part of and a supplement to the 'Bohr side'. 
Though Bohr is often portrayed as one of the founding fathers of quantum mechanics, the 
role of Heisenberg should not be underestimated. It was Heisenberg who, in 1925, formulated 
the first complete, self-consistent theory of quantum mechanics, known as Matrix mechanics, 
just before Schrödinger published his paper on wave mechanics. In 1926 Heisenberg suggested 
that uncertainty plays a central role in the quantum world, which led to one of his main 
contributions to quantum mechanics - the uncertainty principle (Gribbin, 1998: 173-174). 
In a 1927 paper, Heisenberg himself comments on, what the uncertainty principle entails: 
'We cannot know, as a matter of principle, the present in all its detail' (Gribbin, 1998: 418). This 
quote hardly exhausts everything the uncertainty principle has to say, but it does accentuate its 
conclusion: we cannot know everything. The basic premises from which the uncertainty 
principle departs is that every experiment “destroys” some of the variables we, as an observer, 
can determine (Heisenberg, 1949: 20). It's important to say, that the use of the word 'destroy' 
does not literally mean that variables are destroyed in the process of measurement, but instead it 
refers to that fact that quantum entities cannot possess both conjugated variables simultaneously, 
as mentioned in the states section, and therefore we cannot know both position and momentum 
simultaneously. This nuance is expressed in the following quote by Heisenberg: 
 
“This assumption [the idea that interaction between object and subject can be reduced by 
control experiments] is not permissible in atomic physics; the interaction between 
observer and object causes uncontrollable and large changes in the system being 
observed, because of the discontinuous changes characteristic of atomic processes. The 
immediate consequence of this circumstance is that in general every experiment 
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performed to determine some numerical quantity renders the knowledge of others 
illusory, since the uncontrollable perturbation of the observed system alters the values of 
previously...” (Heisenberg, 1949: 3) 
 
Heisenberg, like Bohr, thus thought that the experimental circumstances and the observation 
have great implications for what we can know, and cannot be disregarded in science making. 
        Heisenberg’s formula for the uncertainty within the variables of a quantum entity 
supports Bohr’s idea on a more conceptual formulation as well:  
 
“They represent complementarity and mutually exclusive aspects of atomic phenomena”, 
Heisenberg continues “There exists a body of exact mathematical laws, but these cannot 
be interpreted as expressing simple relationships between objects existing in space and 
time” (Heisenberg, 1949: 64).  
 
This implies that the laws of quantum mechanics apply differently than the laws of classical in 
that they do not relate to objects in time and space, and as such we cannot imagine them in the 
same sense as we can with objects within classical. 
        We have previously mentioned that the Copenhagen interpretation included different 
ideas within quantum theory. One of these ideas was wave mechanics, which the main character 
of the next section introduced in 1926. 
  
ERWIN SCHRÖDINGER 
 
Erwin Schrödinger was born in Austria in 1887. By 1926 he had published one of the 
greatest works in quantum mechanical theory. In a paper titled “Quantisierung als 
Eigenwertproblem” (Quantization as an Eigenvalue Problem) Schrödinger puts forth his most 
famous equation, which might actually be considered several equations (depending on the 
system), simply called the Schrödinger Equation (Web 6). The equation we are most concerned 
with is the time-dependent Schrödinger equation. It looks like this. 
iℏ
∂
∂t
𝜓 = ?̂?𝜓 
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What this equation describes is the change, or evolution, of a quantum system over time. It 
expresses what is called wave mechanics. To break down the equation we will start on the left 
side, the side that describes the particle. i is an imaginary unit, used in mapping i axis in 
replacement of the y in Cartesian coordinates. The h bar (ℏ) is the short hand of planks constant 
(
ℎ
2𝜋
). The old style delta (∂) divided by delta t expresses a partial derivative in regard to t (time), 
the rate of change of the wave function. Finally the psi (𝜓) is the wave function of the system. In, 
hopefully, simpler terms, the left side is mapping the rate of change of the wave function regards 
to the right side, the full potential energy of the system. To further explain the right side, the H 
hat (?̂?), is a Hamiltonian operator, an expression of the total energy of a system depending on 
the systems variables, and again, we have the wave function (𝜓) that the Hamiltonian operator 
effects. All in all, the equation is trying to map the energies of a quantum system at any point in 
time as a wave function in relation to the total energy of the system. Eventually this is refined as 
the probability wave of the particle. While that may not have served to clarify anything 
mathematically speaking, we can still set forth and explore the importance of this equation and 
the grounding theories and epistemological standpoint in which it was developed and how that 
changed (Schrödinger, 1983: 328). 
While Schrödinger may be considered a founder of modern quantum mechanics, his 
initial intention was not to further the divide between classical physics and quantum mechanics. 
On the contrary, he was trying to describe the particle-wave duality of quantum mechanics in 
closer relation to the classical terms of a physical wave. He wanted to create a continuous notion 
of the wave function where the position of the particle could be determined at a given time and 
the energy of the system could be defined via the Hamiltonian operator. What was discovered 
was that this could not be done in any satisfactory way because of the collapse of the wave 
function; a point highlighted by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, in that, once part of the 
system was defined, the rest of the information about the system was lost. Basically the wave 
function system stopped existing once a measurement was taken of either position or momentum. 
Only a probability of the position of particle could be derived in this way. Because of the slight 
discrepancies in Schrödinger’s original thoughts and the inability of his equations to conform 
completely in classical terms a revision of his epistemological approach occurred that we see 
reflected upon in a paper that presented his famous paradox (Schrödinger, 1983: 328). 
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In his paper titled “Die Naturwissenschaften” (The Present Situation in Quantum 
Mechanics), Schrödinger describes the necessary change in epistemological views that quantum 
mechanics necessitates. He begins by describing the definition of classical states and the 
determinable relation systems seem to adhere to in classical though. Schrödinger criticizes this in 
relation to quantum theory, that “models with determining parts that uniquely determine each 
other, as do the classical ones, cannot do justice to nature” (Schrödinger, 1983: 324). He 
continues that only half of any system can be determined at any given time, citing Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle. He calls this the “Maximal Knowledge” of any system. This knowledge of 
the system doesn’t exist in a causally determined form, because the classical system doesn’t 
hold. As far as a causal system exists it is in the change in possibilities (Schrödinger, 1983: 325). 
He insists this as the true difference between classical and quantum views and that quantum 
mechanics still entails the classical lines of thought but only insofar as the determinable parts are 
just predictable possibilities within maximal knowledge of a state (Schrödinger, 1983: 338). 
Here Schrödinger has to deal with a problem in imagining a system where only half of 
“reality” can be determined. This reliance on averaging variables in the wave function seems to 
blur the picture of what can be definably said. Schrödinger implies the failure of language in 
describing quantum mechanics, and also our ability to conceptualize because of our attachment 
of terms to definite classical concepts. In this instance he uses the now called “Schrödinger’s Cat 
Paradox”, not only to express this shortcoming of terms, but also highlight the absurdity of the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. In the paradox, the blurring of variables in a 
quantum state can have some perplexing results; say if a system has a fifty-fifty chance of 
probability, the truth about the system can never be said in certainty until an observation, or 
measurement, is made that collapses the wave function. In instances like this the system is said to 
be in a state of superposition, a state where something can be both alive and dead, black and 
white, or hot and cold, at the same time. Schrödinger deems this an overstretching, 
misconstruction, or incomplete sense of the concepts of quantum mechanics (Schrödinger, 1983: 
328). 
The importance of the concept observation that this paradox brings out is another central 
focus for Schrödinger in the paper. Observation, but more specifically measurement, is a concept 
that Schrödinger thinks needs to be reassessed. In his description of measurement of a system 
Schrödinger points out that measurement is not an isolated system, simply observing another. In 
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reality, measurement is its own wave function, so measurement is actually the interaction of two 
wave functions which results in the collapse of both systems and the creation of a new 
“entangled” system, defined by its own unique wave function. In this way, no measurement is 
ever descriptive of just one system, it is a system in itself. This is the reason why no two catalogs 
of measurement of a system can ever fully contain the information of each other (Schrödinger, 
1983: 330). The implications on relativistic views are troubling. Because the content of any wave 
function is only ever fifty percent of a system how can we ever know a system with 100 percent 
reliability. The resonating effects of this on philosophical thought is not lost on Schrödinger and 
this is where we will pick up the debate further on. 
In the past three sections we have composed a brief description of the most important 
theories in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, namely those of Niels Bohr, 
Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schrödinger. In the next section we will present the views of 
Albert Einstein, who did not agree with this interpretation, but in fact thought of it as incomplete.  
 
EINSTEIN 
 
The German physicist, Albert Einstein, is probably one of the most, if not the most, well 
known scientists of our time. Besides his two theories of relativity, Einstein also played a major 
role in the development of quantum mechanics (Gribbin, 1998: 116). In this paper we will 
mostly be concerned with Einstein's critique of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, and not his other contributions to the quantum theory. In this section we will present 
some of this critique as it was published in 1935 in the so called EPR-paper. Though Einstein did 
not write this on his own, we will use it as an account for his views and thus disregard his co-
authors 
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THE EPR-ARTICLE OF 1935 
 
One of the most famous papers about quantum physics is the Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen 
article from 1935. The paper is an attack on what Einstein referred to as 'spooky action at a 
distance' as suggested in the theory of Niels Bohr (Ford, 2011: 248).  
It is the hypothesis in the EPR-article that the theory of quantum mechanics is incomplete 
as a description of reality as given by a wave function. To argue their case, two criterions are set 
forth. The first is what they call that condition of completeness: “every element of the physical 
reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory” (Einstein, 1935: 777). A theory is 
complete if it meets this condition of completeness. Furthermore this condition implies an 
understanding of physical reality as being understandable though physical theory of experiments 
and measurements. As for their definition of reality, the second criterion says:  
 
“If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with 
probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of 
physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity” (Einstein, 1935: 777). 
 
As such, their definition of reality holds a criterion of existence as well - i.e. we know the 
electron exists, if we can measure it. To Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen this definition, and 
therefore condition, of reality is compatible with both classical and quantum mechanics.  
The EPR paper sets out to explore and present a mathematical problem to prove their 
beginning premises of that of the axiom of completeness and the axiom of existence. The 
argument is arranged as follows:  
that, 
“(1) The quantum mechanical description of reality given by the wave function is not 
complete or  
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(2) when the operators corresponding to two physical systems do not commute the two 
quantities cannot have simultaneous reality” (Einstein, 1935: 780).  
Obviously Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen are advocates for the first of the two options, 
and to prove their opinion right, they give yet another example to point out a contradiction 
between the theory of quantum mechanics and the criterion of reality. This example is the 
following (abridged) thought experiment that contributed massively to the awareness that the 
article raised. 
In their presentation of the mathematics you have two systems with one degree of 
freedom. They are represented by the variables of system 1 and system 2 by 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 
respectively. Together they become a wave function, 𝜓(𝑥1, 𝑥2). Psi (𝜓) denoting an interaction 
between the two into a single overall system. The system can have many different physical 
quantities, for one of the systems, say variables 𝑥1, a quantity can be ascribed the character 𝐴. for 
this physical quantity you get a series of values, eigenvalues, which are variable. If you were to 
measure quantity 𝐴 you would get a specific eigenvalue that you could then ascribe to the overall 
system. It could be represented by (𝑥1)z.  What EPR argue mathematically is that any value 
ascribed to system variables 𝑥1 would ultimately give a value to system variables 𝑥2 in regards to 
the system as a whole. This reasoning logical follows, a different variable in one part of an 
equation will affect the rest. But the problem in the matter of the system as a whole is twofold. 
One being, that if you take another quantity, say 𝐵, on system variables 𝑥1, system variables 𝑥2 
is again affected and gets a new, different value. This creates two different wave functions, two 
different systems that describe the same reality. They see that “as a consequence of two different 
measurements performed upon the first system, the second system may be left in states with two 
different wave functions”. (Einstein, 1935: 779) 
The second problem is that, while the overall system is described as one wave function, 
the two systems have physically separated. There is no longer any locality and thus the operators 
should not commute, so system variables 𝑥2 shouldn’t really be changed by anything done to 
system variables 𝑥1. They should have their own unique values, or realities. EPR seemingly 
proved that within quantum mechanics this is not the case and that two non-commuting operators 
can share the same reality. 
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These examples illustrate, what for EPR was a contradiction and a paradox in quantum 
mechanics, since it exemplifies that it is possible to assign two different wave functions to the 
same reality (Einstein, 1935: 779). This contradiction, as they view it, is in contention of 
entanglement as well. The argument is that since at the time of measurement the two systems no 
longer interact, no real change can take place in the second system in consequence of anything 
that may be done to the first system (Einstein, 1935: 779). That such a real change could actually 
occur is what Einstein mockingly called 'spooky action at a distance'.  
To Einstein the idea of non-locality, entanglement, was absurd and conflicted with his 
special relativity theory - that it is impossible for communication to take place faster than the 
speed of light. The point of the EPR-paper was then to demonstrate the flawed element in 
quantum mechanics. But even though the paper received a great deal of attention when it was 
published, later experiments showed that nature does behave according to non-locality as 
suggested by Bohr (Gribbin, 1998: 126-127). 
  EPR now goes on to use these results in a logical statement to further disprove quantum 
mechanics’ completeness. If we refer back to their two refuting statements and we were to say 
that (1) is false, that the wave function actually does describe reality in completeness, the 
problem arises in this negating (2), because having just arrived at the conclusion that two 
physical quantities with non-commuting operators can have simultaneous reality, if the quantum 
mechanical description is right, this creates a picture of reality that, in their opinion, cannot be 
true.. Therefore (1) must be wrong. So, negating (2) actually leads back to (1). Logically you are 
at an impasse and the only statement you can except on this criteria is (1) leading to the quantum 
mechanics description of reality remaining incomplete. 
Logically stated it looks like this: 
(1) + (2) 
¬ (1) → ¬(2) 
(1) + (2) ≡ ¬ (1) → (2) 
− − − − − − − − − 
(1) 
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Though Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen had intended their objection to quantum mechanics as a 
thought experiment, it led to actual experiments proving the exact same thing they were 
objecting against. David Bohm (1917-1992) adapted the basic idea from EPR in the 1950s, and 
John Bell (1928-1990) refined it in the 1960s until it finally in the 1980s was carried out as an 
experiment with the Aspect experiment done by Alain Aspect (1947-) (Gribbin, 1998: 126).     
In the end the debate between the views of EPR and Bohr was concerned with the way 
quantum mechanics should be developed to serve as a theory describing the quantum phenomena 
as accurate as possible. This development led to many innovations in the field of physics, and 
gave physics the new field of quantum mechanics. Though these developments were to be 
interpreted and here the debate between EPR and Bohr comes into play. Physics had gained a 
new vocabulary, new methods and experimental data but these were in need of a scientific 
‘reflection’.   The definition of ‘state’ changed radically from a classical model of commuting 
variables to a quantum mechanical theory of probability and uncertainty. This led, through the 
confirmation of the uncertainty principle in the double-slit experiment, to a range of different 
interpretations about the completeness of science. Was quantum science a theory that was 
incomplete as advocated by Einstein (EPR), of was Bohr’s concept of ‘complementarity’ the 
final answer to how quantum mechanics should be interpreted. Of course, when one discusses 
the completeness of a scientific theory in term of ‘what we can know about a system’, 
philosophy becomes considerably more present in the debate. 
        In the following chapter we will go into different philosophical views on reality. The 
focus will lie on the aspects underpinning realist and anti-realist theories concerning science; 
going over core concepts of these theories and, later throughout the paper, interpreting them 
within the discussed theories of quantum mechanics. 
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THEORY OF REALISM IN PHILOSOPHY 
 
SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND ANTI-REALISM 
 
What is reality and what can we know about it? Questions like these have always been 
central to philosophical debates and constructions of ontology and epistemology - from before 
Plato and up to present time. Plato's cave allegory questions what wisdom is, and who might gain 
it by seeing the 'true world'. Descartes' thought experiment constitutes res cogitans as the basic 
foundation of knowledge - questioning everything but the fact that I am while I'm thinking that I 
am. Neo is in for a rude awakening in The Matrix, when he discovers that his reality was a 
fiction, and that the real reality is outside of the computer created matrix-world. Questions about 
the nature of reality are important to us, because the answers are the core of our understanding of 
the world we inhabit.   
In this paper we are less concerned with metaphysical views on reality and more with 
scientific ones. That is to say that we will be focusing on what our included theorists of quantum 
mechanics thinks science, and specifically quantum mechanics, can tell us about reality.   
Debates about scientific realism and anti-realism concern themselves with the nature of 
scientific knowledge and is thus central to the philosophy of science. Scientific realists have a 
positive attitude about scientific theories and their ability to provide knowledge about the 
observable and unobservable elements of the world. This view is opposed by so called scientific 
anti-realists, who are less content with science as a portrayer of reality (Chakravartty, 2013). 
In this section we will explain relevant aspects of scientific realism and anti-realism, with 
the purpose of construction an analytic tool with which we may detect our included theorists' 
views on scientific realism and anti-realism in respect to quantum theory. 
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DISTINCTIONS IN SCIENTIFIC REALISM 
 
As mentioned above, scientific realism can briefly be described as an epistemologically 
positive attitude towards scientific results about observable and unobservable aspect of the 
world, and scientific anti-realism is thus a more or less skeptical attitude towards the same 
thought. That being said, defining scientific realism and anti-realism isn't confined to two distinct 
theories. They are both, like most philosophical theories, houses with many different rooms. The 
definitions mentioned above may be adequate in describing the facade of the house, but walking 
through the front door the differences of the many rooms reveal themselves. To better understand 
the nuances of scientific realism we will divide the topic into three dimensions, the ontological, 
the semantic and the epistemological, and relate these to realism about theories and realism about 
entities. In the following we will also mention observables and unobservables. It is important to 
mention here that these differ conceptually from the physics sense of the words in how they 
pertain to macroscopic and microscopic entities, things we can plainly see and those we cannot. 
This distinction depends upon human sensory capabilities. Observables are what we can perceive 
with our unaided senses - such as mountains, tables and chairs. Unobservables are those we 
cannot perceive with only our senses - such as electrons, spins and states (Chakravartty, 2013).   
The ontological dimension of scientific realism is concerned with the mind-independent 
existence of the world science is investigating. A realist on the subject might say that the world 
and the objects that science investigates exist independently of our perception of them. Anti-
realist accounts of this more or less deny the existence of a world independent of the mind. 
Opinions like this are most often seen in idealism, phenomenology and neo-Kantianism. The last 
one is perhaps one of the more common fields of thought, claiming that the world of our 
experience isn't mind-independent and that science thus isn't investigating 'the world itself', 
though neo-Kantian views usually believes that the existence of the world itself does not depend 
upon the mind (Chakravartty, 2013). This ontological dimension is clearly connected with 
realism about entities. Canadian philosopher of science, Ian Hacking (1936-), makes a distinction 
between realism about entities and realism about theories. The first concerns itself with the 
actual existence of theoretical entities - examples of which could be particles, structures and 
states. A realist of entities would say that these, or a good many of these, theoretical entities do 
Page 32 of 66 
 
in fact exist. Oppositely, a blunt anti-realist of entities denies the existence of theoretical entities, 
and instead writes it off as fictions, logical constructions or elements of intellectual instruments 
for reasoning about the world. A more 'diplomatic' anti-realist might say that we don't have, and 
might not be able to achieve, any reason to believe that theoretical entities are anything other 
than fictions. Furthermore, they might exist, but that assumption isn't needed in our 
understanding of the world (Hacking, 1983: 26-27). 
The semantic dimension entails a literal interpretation of scientific claims about the 
world. Realists thus take scientific statements and scientific theories about entities, both 
observables and unobservables, at 'face value' - as having truth value. This is usually opposed by 
instrumentalist views of epistemology, which states that descriptions of unobservables simply 
serve as instruments for predictions and systemization, and so shouldn't be taken literally 
(Chakravartty, 2013). 
The epistemological dimension of realism focuses on the ability of theoretical claims to 
provide knowledge about the world. Generally realists think that the best scientific theories give 
true, or at least approximately true, descriptions of a mind-independent world, including both 
observable and unobservable aspects. Contrary to this, anti-realist accounts question whether 
scientific investigation can provide such 'true' knowledge and some believe that only knowledge 
about the observables is obtainable (Chakravartty, 2013). Both the semantic and the 
epistemological dimension are closely tied to realism about theories. Realism about theories 
revolves around the question of, whether scientific theories are true or false independent of what 
we know. A realist answer to this would be that scientific theories are true or false independent 
of our knowledge - or at least that science aims at the truth, and that truth is how the world is. An 
anti-realist reply to the question might on the other hand be that scientific theories are not true, 
but at most adequate and acceptable (Hacking, 1983: 27-28).  
 
TO BE OR NOT TO BE A SCIENTIFIC REALIST? 
 
To be a scientific realist one doesn't necessarily need to accept all of the dimensions. 
Also, being a scientific anti-realism doesn't necessarily entail the rejection of all of the 
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dimensions. There are numerous combinations of these realistic and anti-realistic views, and we 
will briefly mention some of them to enhance some of the nuances within the debate of scientific 
realism, and to show that views of realism aren't all black or white. 
Just because one believes in an external world, it does not have to necessarily follow that 
it in any way is describable or experienced 'as it is' by us. Thus one can be an ontological realist, 
but not an epistemological one. Being an epistemological realist can be closely tied to that of 
semantic realism because 
 
...one cannot have knowledge about anything in the world unless statements about the 
world are truth-valuable...The semantic issue of realism is whether truth is an objective 
relation between language and reality. It is common to take semantic realism as defining 
truth as a correspondence (Dudau, 2002: 7-6).   
 
This kind of realism makes a connection between knowledge and truth as being one and the 
same, thus making semantic and epistemological realism dependent on each other.  
All of this is to say that one does not have to be a realist about all of the dimensions - one 
doesn't need to be a realist about both theories and entities either. Being a realist or an anti-realist 
concerning either theories or entities, or, both, is not confined to a few easily quantifiable 
stances. The examples stated above in the division of realism of theories and entities is therefore 
to be understood as such - as just examples, not exhaustive descriptions of the different 
variations of realism and anti-realism. 
Being an anti-realist doesn't necessarily mean that you deny both realism about theories 
and realism about entities. One just might be a realist about entities, but an anti-realist 
concerning theories. Hacking exemplifies with many Fathers of the Church, who believed in the 
existence of God (realism about entities), but denied the possibility of a true positive intelligible 
theory about God (anti-realism about theories). Oppositely one could be a realist about theories, 
but an anti-realist about entities, though this might seem strange. Hacking mentions welsh 
philosopher, Bertrand Russell (1872-1870), as an early example of this kind of anti-realism. 
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Russell did not doubt the truth of theories, but was instead concerned with unobservable entities, 
'theoretical entities', the theory of which he thought should be re-written as logical constructions 
that uses terms as complex expressions referring only to observed phenomena (Hacking, 1983: 
27). 
As of now we've introduced relevant quantum theory from theorists such as Bohr, 
Heisenberg, Schrödinger and Einstein. We have also presented theory of scientific realism, 
which recognizes ontology, semantics and epistemology as dimensions for scientific realism. To 
these we also related scientific realism about entities and theories, to add more specific 
perspective to the theory of scientific realism. In the next section we will 'merge' the theory of 
quantum mechanics with the theory of scientific realism as to deduce the views on scientific 
realism that are represented in the included quantum theories. As such, the theory of scientific 
realism will be applied as an analytic framing. We will continue the current structure, and 
therefore present first an analysis of Bohr, then Heisenberg and Schrödinger, and at the end 
Einstein. After this we will proceed into different aspects of discussion, including comparisons, 
scientific views and problems of conceptualization. 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
THE PHYSICISTS AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM:  
 
 
BOHR ON REALITY 
 
As we know Niels Bohr was one of the greatest physicists of our time. We’ve seen how 
his development of Quantum Mechanics led to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. This interpretation is also highly grounded in his own philosophical construction of 
how he approaches reality, science and ultimately knowledge, but what precisely are those 
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views? This topic is one that receives much debate. In some views he is seen as a neo-Kantian, in 
others he is viewed as a positivist, some consider him to be an instrumentalist, and still there are 
many other categories that it could be argued he falls under. What seems apparent is that the 
perspective drawn upon in analyzing his views can sometimes become narrow in the wish to 
adhere him to some specific doctrine, but we believe that the breath of his personal philosophy 
and his vagueness in expressing complementarity is what makes it so difficult to put him into a 
box in regards to realism. This is because it is a matter of interpretation whether he's seen as a 
realist or an anti-realist, this again depends on how one understands those stances. Here we will 
try to ground his view in his scientific view at the time of the quantum mechanics debate. A good 
point of departure in explaining his views on these matters is to start with the theory of 
complementarity. 
        The concept of complementarity is central to how Bohr constructed his framework in 
regards to scientific knowledge and how he approached merging the worlds of classical and 
quantum mechanics. In short he believed that these two worlds complimented each other, that 
they both described a separate side of the same coin. In a more complex description he held two 
thoughts, 
 
“On the one hand, there are those that attribute either kinematic or dynamic properties 
to the atom; that is, “space-time descriptions” are complementary to “claims of 
causality”, where Bohr interpreted the causal claims in physics in terms of the 
conservation of energy and momentum. On the other hand, there are those descriptions 
that ascribe either wave or particle properties to a single object” (Bokulich, 2010). 
 
Here Bohr is explaining the differences in between the views of classical and quantum states and 
joining them to define reality as a combination of the two. This idea of complementarity was 
only loosely described by Bohr but seems to have a great deal of influence on the advent of the 
Copenhagen interpretation and can be seen reflected in the views he holds in regards to his 
ontological and epistemological construction. 
        In our opinion, it can be assumed that Bohr believed in the existence of an independent 
reality, he was in fact a physicist, the study of the natural world tends to be the focus, but that 
doesn’t mean he thought that the independent world was the exact object of our experience. His 
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ontological construction could be said to be that of the minimalist, or in some cases that of a 
positivist, in that he simply discounted answerable questions as unnecessary to ask. Thusly 
discounting the unknown metaphysical nature of reality. He developed this in line with his 
empirical nature and thought that experimentation was the route to deriving any truth about 
reality (Bokulich, 2010). 
        In as far as Bohr’s epistemological framework goes, we again are pointed to his empirical 
nature. Bohr did believe in the existence of theory but only insofar as its ability to be used in 
experiment and their compliance with complementarity, only this could allow them to be 
ultimately proven. This necessity of experimentation for Bohr tells us what he sees as 
knowledge. This conceptual reality built out of experimentation, which can only be done within 
our empirical facilities, is why some consider Bohr of the order of neo-Kantian. Simply put, 
Bohr could be interpreted to believe that observation is what ultimately “made” reality. Some 
could argue that his acceptance of unobservable directly negates this hard line neo-Kantian view, 
and it is not necessarily true to state that Bohr believed that reality existed only in our 
consciousness, as much as he believed that observation was the only way to know that there was 
a reality (Bokulich, 2010). 
        Another important avenue of Bohr’s view on reality was that of the interplay between the 
observer and the observed. Bohr’s view on the theory of interference, while it affected his view 
on quantum systems, did not affect his view of classical systems. In his opinion the classical 
systems were too large, and observation, i.e. a light sources, of negligible consequences in 
regards to interference, in those systems. They also lacked the complete, or mostly complete, 
isolation of experiments done in quantum systems. If we abstract the performance of observation 
to the act of measurement, he believed any measurement to be an interference in these delicate 
quantum systems, and in essence, systems themselves, thusly entangling two quantum systems 
and producing a new system. This can be seen as a view grounded in instrumentalism and the 
importance of the consideration of measurement, or observation, in regards to how we view 
reality (Faye, 2008). 
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BOHR AS AN ANTI-REALIST 
 
Bohr can be said to be an anti-realist when it comes to epistemological realism because of 
his understanding of what the wave function represents. In opposition to the realists search for 
truth, Bohr's view is that the wave function is a state of probability of a specific quantum system, 
and that the wave function representation is the only and most adequate representation we can 
achieve. Also, if scientific theories are meant to represent a mind-independent world, and thus 
describe it, the Copenhagen interpretation is dissatisfying to a realist because of the measurement 
problem, since the theory of the Copenhagen interpretation doesn't include an explanation of the 
physical process in which the wave function collapses. But Bohr didn't seem to be too struck by 
this point of criticism, which might be a reason for calling him a semantic anti-realist when it 
comes to quantum mechanics. To Bohr the wave function is a symbolic representation of a 
mixed system. It is symbolic because the quantum system cannot be viewed in time and space 
like classical physics can. Thus we can't use the literal language of classical to explain quantum 
mechanics. As such, Bohr didn't think that the quantum mechanical theories should be given too 
literal interpretations (Faye, 2010: 107-108). Bohr himself expresses this opinion in 1948: 
 
“The entire formalism is to be seen as a tool for making predictions... These symbols, 
which are already implied by the use of imaginary numbers, are not themselves 
susceptible to figurative interpretation; and even derived real functions like densities and 
currents can only be regarded as expressions of the probabilities concerning the 
emergence of individual occurrences, which can be observed under well-defined 
experimental conditions” (Faye, 2010: 108-109).    
 
Bohr regards the wave function as a symbolic tool, which provides us with probabilities 
for the single quantum system. Thus, it is not a literal representation of reality 'as it is'. In that 
sense, Bohr can be seen as an anti-realist about epistemology and semantics. The symbolic 
nature of quantum theory is hinted to be related to the use of imaginary numbers, such as the 
square root of minus one, which appears in both Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and 
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Schrödinger's equation. The mathematical formalism is to be understood abstractly and as a tool 
for making predictions (Faye, 2010: 109). This coheres with Bohr's view that  
 
“..descriptions of nature we are not dealing with exposure of the real nature of the 
phenomenon’s, but only with to the largest degree trace connections in the multiplicity of 
our experiences” (Faye, 2010: 109).  
 
As such, science provides connections of our experiences, but it does not make us see 
reality 'as it is'. It can thus be assumed that Bohr was an anti-realist about theories in the sense 
that quantum mechanical theories don't precisely picture a mind-independent reality, because 
they include imaginary numbers. But Bohr can be seen as a realist in another regard - about 
entities. His theory of complementarity doesn't raise any doubt about the existence of atoms, and 
Bohr himself thought that experiments had erased any doubts on that matter (Faye, 2010: 110). 
Ascribing anti-realist views to Bohr is often connected with considering him, as 
mentioned earlier, as a neo-Kantian, which we will elaborate on here. Bohr is cited for saying 
that “..measurement has an essential influence on the conditions on which the very definition of 
the physical quantities in question rests” (Krips, 2013). As such, Bohr ascribes measurement and 
observation constitutive properties, which go against realist views of observations reflecting 
things 'as they are', both during before and after the observation. But Bohr and Kant weren't all 
thick as thieves - in fact, Bohr disagreed with Kant on an essential view, and instead 'flipped' it to 
fit his own philosophical views. Bohr didn't mean, as Kant did, that space and time is a priori 
categories necessary for the comprehension of knowledge. Instead of thinking that time and 
space give form to the experienced, Bohr meant that the experience determined the applicability 
of concepts such as time and space. Especially the conditions of observation is of importance to 
Bohr, when it comes to applying time and space as concepts for comprehending knowledge. To 
Kant, observation as a mental faculty, which gives form to experiences. To Bohr, observation is 
an external procedure that determine both what we see and how we describe it (Krips, 2013). 
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Ascribing realist or anti-realist views to any one depends on, which definition of these 
two stances one operates with. It seems that Einstein might regard Bohr, or Bohr's opinions in 
form of the Copenhagen interpretation, as an anti-realist view. In the EPR-paper Einstein and co. 
express two criteria for the completeness of a theory in respects to describing reality. As we will 
see in the analysis section on Einstein, Bohr and his Copenhagen interpretation do not fulfil these 
terms.   
 
HEISENBERG AND INSTRUMENTALISM 
 
Before we ground Heisenberg’s teachings in philosophical themes, a quote might set the 
tone for this following chapter: 
 
“There exists a body of exact mathematical laws, but these cannot be interpreted as 
expressing simple relationships between objects existing in space and time. […] it is not 
possible to decide, other than arbitrarily, what objects are to be considered as part of the 
observed system and what as part of the observer’s apparatus. In the formulas of the 
theory [Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle] this arbitrariness makes it possible to use 
quite different analytical methods for the treatment of a single physical experiment.” 
(Heisenberg, 1949: 64) 
 
Since we are dealing with the philosophical implications of cornerstones within quantum 
mechanics in this paper, one can ask himself about the underlying philosophy of the German 
physicist Werner Heisenberg. Though in the statements above there is little trace of any 
philosophical theory, it might be advocated that it is exactly this lack of a philosophical judgment 
that underpins Heisenberg’s - as well as to some extend Bohr’s - theory and ideas about quantum 
mechanics as being Instrumentalist. 
Let us first look at what instrumentalism is. As having obtained great influence on the 
school of Logical Positivism, the classical notion of Instrumentalism has its roots within 
empiricism and sees theories merely as conceptual tools for “classifying, systematizing and 
predicting observational statements” (Niiniluoto, 2011). So in essence instrumentalists don’t 
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attribute any truth status to the ontological question by which Realists or anti-Realists are 
concerned, but use them solely as a conceptual tool to understand the phenomena they observe 
be it in experiment or in daily life. Though, it is not to say that Instrumentalists puts himself 
completely out of this distinction, but he purely does away with the question whether objects 
‘exist’ or not. Rather being an ad hoc acceptance than a question about the true nature of things, 
Instrumentalism seem to divide these objects or phenomena into two categories namely the 
observable, and the non-observable (Chakravartty, 2013). 
Heisenberg as an instrumentalist is of the opinion that we cannot always say something 
about the unobservable - in fact we can only say something about while we a making 
measurements of is. As such, we cannot say anything about the position of an electron, or even 
that it has one, when we are not measuring it. This implies that our knowledge only goes as far as 
our experiments and measurements, and it is not meaningful to speak of anything beyond this. 
The truth-statement might sound confusing, and we might see it as an ontological statement that 
‘everything we can talk about exists’ -somewhat of a naïve view on phenomena and reality in 
general- but this is quite the opposite of what instrumentalism is trying to reach according to its 
definition. 
Furthermore, what does this then say about the Instrumentalist view on science? If we are 
talking about science in a (anti-)Realism sense, we are implying a distinction on the basis of 
ontology. Do objects exist independently of us, or are they a constructed entity depending on our 
subjective framework. Like said before, Instrumentalism is not concerned with these kind of 
ontological questions because it solely focuses on the epistemological aspect of science, namely 
theories. Therefore it holds that theories in itself do not have any value of truth to them, but are 
merely tools or instruments that are to be understood as having no literal character in themselves 
(Hacking, 1983: 63).  
 
“The very fact that the formalism of quantum mechanics cannot be interpreted as visual 
description of a phenomenon occurring in space and time shows that quantum mechanics 
is in no way concerned with the objective determination of space-time phenomena.” 
(Heisenberg, 1933: 296) 
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Heisenberg continues by stating that the quantum mechanical formalism should be used as an 
‘instrument’ for describing the experiment. Also, this formalism should only include the must 
necessitated aspects of the experiment, thus making sure disturbances are reduced as much as 
possible (Heisenberg, 1933: 296-297). What we can see here is the idea that scientific formalism 
is purely a tool for understanding the experiment and the quantum behavior observed. One 
should not go as far as seeing mathematics, or formalism in general, as a separate ‘literal’ system 
influencing the experiment. It has to be interpreted as, like mentioned before, a conceptual tool 
of description.   
A concept that one might link to this view of science is Bas van Fraassen’s “empirical 
adequacy” (Niiniluoto, 2011). This term explains the core of instrumentalist thought, namely that 
a model is able to explain or contain all the phenomena; by which we not only mean observed 
phenomena, but also those that lie in the past and future (Achinstein, 2004: 287). This enables us 
to make predictions, and to apply the theory at all time. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle can be 
seen as an expression of empirical adequacy. According to the principle we are only able to 
know so much, but this 'much' is all we can know, and so it is empirically adequate, though not 
'truth' as a realist about theories would have hoped to achieve. 
 
SCHRÖDINGER’S REALISM 
 
Schrödinger was a brilliant scientist and physicist who helped create Quantum mechanics 
as it is today, and we can interestingly see in the field of physics that the advent of this new 
theory created a shift in paradigm that opened a debate about the true nature of reality, and what 
we could say about it. Many camps were created, views were built and debated, a debate that 
Schrödinger himself also weighed in on. Schrödinger agreed, to some extent, with Einstein in the 
incompleteness of quantum mechanics. He didn't like the central role that randomness had come 
to play in quantum theory, and he especially cursed that quantum leap, strongly stating that 'I 
don't like it, and I wish I never had anything to do with it' (Gribbin, 1998: 354). Even so, his 
wave mechanics did not, as he had hoped, solve the mysteries of quantum mechanics, and 
therefore Schrödinger is still seen as a prominent figure, whose wave mechanics came to form 
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the Copenhagen interpretation alongside the theory of Heisenberg and Bohr (Gribbin, 1998: 
354). 
        In his paper “The Present Situation in Quantum Mechanics” Schrödinger presents a view 
of realism quite prominently in the section of ‘The Deliberate About-face of the Epistemological 
Viewpoint’. He appears to have a very empirical viewpoint, in line with that of logical positivists 
but it may be overstretching to say that he is of this philosophy. In some of his statements he says 
we must take the world at face value, but that this value is only in what we can observe. Cleary 
he says that 
 
“We are told that no distinction is to be made between the state of a natural object and 
what I know about it”... “Actually - so they say - there is intrinsically only awareness, 
observation, measurement.” (Schrödinger, 1980: 328) 
 
Here he is expressing views that could be argued to be harbored in that of instrumentalism, but 
the expression of the thought is clouded, using distancing language like “we are told” or “so they 
say” it is hard to pinpoint if he himself actually subscribes to these thoughts. If these thoughts are 
in fact what he philosophically holds, he must then believe in our ability to arrive at 
epistemological facts through our empirical facilities using the tool of measurement (possibly the 
facilities being the measurement themselves). But this does not make clear his thoughts on the 
ontological. In following this line of thought, though, because he refers to the “state of a natural 
object”, he must believe there is an object to refer to, but this does not mean he believes in the 
epistemological independence of the object from himself. On the contrary it could be argued that 
for Schrödinger, epistemologically, objects are mind-dependent because no distinction can be 
made between object and knowledge. He makes a point about this later in the paper reinforcing 
this line of thought, saying that,  
 
“one lets go of naïve realism and leans directly on the indubitable proposition that 
actually (for the physicist) after all is said and done there is only observation, 
measurement”. (Schrödinger, 1980: 328) 
 
Truly this is a statement of the dependence of knowledge upon observation and measurement. 
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       Even after his epistemological view is obtained his view on the ontological remains unseen. 
One can argue though that he has already alluded to it in expressing his view on the 
epistemological, namely his empirical alignment. Here he states it clearer, in regards to 
observation and measurement he goes on to say, 
 
“If through them I have procured at a given moment the best knowledge of the state of 
the physical object that is possibly attainable in accord with natural laws, then I can turn 
aside as meaningless any further questioning about the "actual state", inasmuch as I am 
convinced that no further observation can extend my knowledge of it…” (Schrödinger, 
1980: 328) 
 
In these statements he is making a stance of his ontological view. It is seemingly not one we 
haven’t seen before, alluding to the “actual state” and the possibility that we may not be able to 
(or that it is simply useless to) question reality further given our limitations in specific events. 
This holds with many others views on ontological reality, that it simply doesn’t matter what true 
nature is, insofar as we can only observe so much of it, but he does not deny the existence of 
entities, in a way he reinforces his belief in them. This reflects a rejection of the importance of 
the metaphysical and is in line with the philosophy of positivism. 
While we have been able to fulfil some of the criteria of classification into realism that 
we have set forth, some of the nuances of Schrödinger’s philosophy are difficult to attain. His 
specific ideas on the independence of reality can only be postulated, but we think it is safe to say 
that, being a physicist and referring to “actual states”, Schrödinger likely believed in an 
independent reality. It can also be suggested that he believed in theories ability to be connected 
with that actual reality seeing as he help create an equation that dealt with unobservables, thus 
Hackings criteria of theories is fulfilled . What doesn’t have to be hypothesized is his thoughts 
on the gap between theory and reality to which he states that “Reality resists imitation through a 
model” (Schrödinger, 1980: 328). Here he expresses his view on the lack of us to completely 
portray reality. This line of thought can also be linked to his understanding and adherence to the 
laws of probability and the uncertainty principle. In them he admits that we can only know so 
much about reality even if we can see a working bigger picture. Here his view is expressed in his 
statements such as that “Maximal knowledge of a total system does not necessarily include total 
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knowledge of all its parts…” (Schrödinger, 1980: 331). Again reinforcing a lack of our ability to 
truly know independent reality and highlighting how much our epistemological framework is 
dependent upon that which we observe, it being an incomplete picture. 
 
EINSTEIN AND REALISM 
 
As we saw in the section on realism and anti-realism, opinions on the subject are not all 
black or white. One can be a realist concerning one matter, and an anti-realist on another. Of the 
physicists included in this paper, one of them does seem stand out as a complete realist, namely 
Einstein. But again claiming this reduces the realism debate to black and white, which especially 
seems odd since Einstein himself denied being a realist. In the following section we will look 
into Einstein's position in the realism/anti-realism debate and give interpretations as to how he 
can be seen as one or the other. 
 
EINSTEIN AS A SCIENTIFIC REALIST 
 
When we state that Einstein can be regarded as a scientific realist, we do so because there 
seems to be an agreement between elements of his theory and some of the before mentioned 
categories of realism. Einstein can be regarded a realist according to the ontological dimension, 
since he expresses a belief in the existence of the world independently of our experience, which 
can be seen in the first couple of sentences in the EPR-paper: 
 
Any serious consideration of a physical theory must take into account the distinction 
between the objective reality, which is independent of any theory, and the physical 
concepts with which the theory operates (Einstein, 1935: 777). 
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Using the term objective reality implies the belief in a world, a physical reality, existing 
independent of our experience and of any theory. 
In Hacking's distinction between realism about entities and realism about theories, 
Einstein seems to be a realist on both accounts. First of all he agrees with the stance that 
theoretical entities like atoms do in fact exist. This seems evident from one of the stated criteria 
in the EPR-paper: 
 
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with 
probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of 
physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity (Einstein, 1935: 777). 
 
Thus, if we can know the physical quantity of say an atom, we know that there does exist a 
physical reality corresponding to this. This means that we can know the physical reality through 
experiments and measurements.   
Secondly, he believes that scientific theories aim at truth in the sense of giving a 
description of physical reality. This is apparent in the other criterion, saying that …”every 
element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory” (Einstein, 1935: 
777). The physical reality is thus describable by physical theory, and this is also, as mentioned 
previously, the condition for the completeness of a theory. This realism about theories is also 
expressed in the opening statements of the paper:  
 
“These [physical] concepts are intended to correspond with the objective reality, and by 
means of these concepts we picture this reality to ourselves” (Einstein, 1935: 777).  
 
The physical concepts are what the theories operate with. If these correspond with the objective 
reality, then scientific theories aren't just adequate, but they are pointing towards a 'true' thing, 
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reality. Also this quote implies something about how we can know something about reality, 
Einstein's epistemological realism - that we can picture reality through scientific theories and 
concepts. 
This kind of realism can be interpreted as a Lockean understanding of perception - that 
we are seeing the things as they exist, independently of being perceived (Krips, 2013). This 
might correspond to Einstein’s opposition to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. As we have mentioned before, the theories of Bohr and Heisenberg entail elements of 
uncertainty, randomness and complementarity. According to these, we can't know everything 
about certain pairs of variables, such as position and momentum. At the quantum level 
probabilistic and random elements play alongside elements of predictability. Einstein wasn't too 
fond of this, and he is often quoted for saying that God does not play dice (Gribbin, 1998: 117). 
As mentioned in the first criterion above, Einstein stated predictability of physical quantities as 
the warrantor for knowing the existence of physical quantities and the physical reality. The 
Copenhagen interpretation was, for Einstein, not compatible with this, and thus it was incomplete 
in describing reality. Also, he didn't like the non-locality and measurement problems included in 
the theory, since they don't commute with knowing things as they are, independent of being 
perceived. To this Einstein once replied: “I'd like to think that the moon is there, even when I'm 
not looking.” (Web 7), hinting that 'spooky action at a distance' and the observer effect was 
nonsense. In Einstein’s realistic mind it just didn't add up. Thus Einstein seems to agree with 
beliefs in local reality, which states that the speed of light is the ultimate limit of speed by which 
interactions can take place. It also entails a belief in ontological realism - that the moon is there, 
even when we're not looking. It is common sense and special theory of relativity combined. 
As mentioned previously, Einstein probably never imagined that the thought experiment 
in the EPR-paper would ever be carried out as a real experiment, but Bell's inequality and the 
Aspect experiments eventually showed that we cannot keep both locality and reality. We have to 
either accept non-locality to maintain an ontological realism, or we can deny non-locality which 
leads to a radically altered ontological realism where things exist in an indeterminate state, like 
with Schrödinger's cat, until observation triggers the collapse of the wave function (Gribben, 
1998: 212).  
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EINSTEIN AS A NON-SCIENTIFIC REALIST 
 
Einstein is known to have said once: “I concede that the natural sciences concern the 
“real,” but I am still not a realist” (Howard, 2010). But how can it be that we in the section 
above can interpret Einstein as a scientific realist if he does not think of himself as such? The 
answer might again be that there is not one agreed-upon definition of scientific realism. It seems 
that Einstein does not regard realism as a philosophical interpretation of scientific theories, but 
instead as a physical postulate (Howard, 2010). In a comment to a Max Born manuscript of 
lectures in 1948, Einstein thus explains: 
 
“I just want to explain what I mean when I say that we should try to hold on to physical 
reality. We are, to be sure, all of us aware of the situation regarding what will turn out to 
be the basic foundational concepts in physics: the point-mass or the particle is surely not 
among them; the field, in the Faraday - Maxwell sense, might be, but not with certainty. 
But that which we conceive as existing ('actual’) should somehow be localized in time 
and space. That is, the real in one part of space, A, should (in theory) somehow ‘exist’ 
independently of that which is thought of as real in another part of space, B. If a physical 
system stretches over the parts of space A and B, then what is present in B should 
somehow have an existence independent of what is present in A. What is actually present 
in B should thus not depend upon the type of measurement carried out in the part of 
space, A; it should also be independent of whether or not, after all, a measurement is 
made in A”  (Howard, 2010). 
 
In this paragraph Einstein defines a criterion for his understanding of 'the real'. It must be 
localized in time and space, and be thought of as existing independently of other real 'things'. 
Thus, Einstein is referring to the claim stated in the EPR-paper, namely that the theory of 
quantum mechanics does not fulfil the criteria of existence and reality. That is, if one accepts 
Einstein's point of view, quantum mechanics does not provide a complete representation of the 
physical reality (Howard, 2010). According to quantum theory, the physical reality of B can 
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actually be affected by measurements performed on A. Entanglement and non-locality thus 
breaks with Einstein's understanding of a complete description of the physical reality. To 
Einstein this entails that what is present in different parts of space does not have an independent, 
real existence, and if that is the case: 
 
“...then I do not at all see what physics is supposed to describe. For what is thought to by 
a ‘system’ is, after all, just conventional, and I do not see how one is supposed to divide 
up the world objectively so that one can make statements about the parts” (Howard, 
2010). 
 
From this quote it is evident that Einstein does consider realism to be a physical postulate, a 
thesis of spatial separability - one necessary for the descriptions of physics. So what Einstein is 
saying, is not that he's a realist but, contrary to other physicists such as Bohr, that quantum 
mechanics cannot be given a realistic interpretation (Howard, 2010). 
In the four previous sections we've applied analytic concepts of scientific realism to the 
views of the included physicists. We have done so to bring out their differences and similarities. 
We can thus conclude that Bohr and Einstein differ in their interpretations of quantum mechanics 
as a full description of reality. While the 'Bohr side' suggests a sense of empirical adequacy in 
saying that quantum mechanics is as full an account for reality as we can achieve, and that this is 
then not seeing the world 'as it is', the 'Einstein side' is not content with this answer, and instead 
asks for a description of reality with certain predictability and coherence, which can let us know 
the world 'as it is'. From this it is concluded that Einstein represents the more realistic side of the 
debate, while Bohr represents the more anti-realist, or instrumentalist or neo-Kantian, side of the 
debate.   
 This enables us to go into further discussion about their philosophical views on reality, 
and we will thus proceed by providing a comparison of Bohr and Einstein. After that we will 
open a discussion on the difficulties in understanding and conceptualizing quantum mechanics 
and suggest why these problems occur, and how we might get rid of them. 
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COMPARISON: BOHR – EINSTEIN 
 
The difference between views has become evident throughout this paper. In this section 
the point of focus will lie on the debate between Bohr and Einstein as we already saw in the 
elaborated parts on their specific interpretations of quantum mechanics. This part will thus be a 
brief overview of their core concepts and ideas, compared against each other. To rephrase it: 
How can it be that scientists cannot arrive at a single interpretation, especially when it should be 
science that strives to give unambiguous answers? Why is it that we can say Bohr and Einstein 
are so different? 
 The main argumentation was brought forth in 1935. Bohr and Einstein had both 
developed radically different interpretations of the quantum mechanical theory and each of the 
men were debating in favor of their own ideas on intellectual grounds. The focal point within the 
discussion was the ‘completeness of quantum theory’. Einstein had shown that Bohr’s theory of 
the quantum systems could not be complete because of it did not create a full description of 
reality, to which Bohr would cite “complementarity”. Therefore, these men held radically 
different views of what science was. To refer back to the question of debate; how can it be that 
these two scientists had different ideas about quantum theory?   
Einstein based himself on a set of criteria for the understanding of reality. Being a realist, 
he held the belief that physical reality was a ‘thing’, lying out there for us to discover (Einstein, 
1935: 777). He also cherished the notion that science ought to be complete. This was the main 
point of argument between Einstein and Bohr, who went against this idea of completeness -
correspondence with reality- with his concept of complementarity. 
Bohr replied to Einstein’s objections on his system within the same year. Surely both 
men were searching after a complete science, a deeper understanding of the quantum phenomena 
they were observing. Though Bohr differentiated from Einstein in the way he should interpret his 
findings on quantum behavior. Among other things, he based himself on the principle of 
uncertainty, the mathematical ground that explained the behavior of quantum entities. Bohr saw 
a problem reoccurring after every experiment, namely the fact that one cannot know, 
simultaneously, the exact position and momentum of a particle. 
The main difference, as we saw earlier, was the fact that Einstein considered Bohr’s 
interpretation as fallacious. And indeed one can interpret this as being so, if one accepts the 
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criteria as stated by Einstein. On the other hand, Bohr explained the ‘incomplete’ knowledge of 
the system in an instrumentalist and neo-Kantian fashion, stating that our ascertainable 
understanding is limited, and that the observer plays a key role in the process of measuring the 
quantum experiment and a particle’s behavior. This led up to “complementarity” (Bohr, 1935: 
700) being his answer to Einstein’s incompleteness; the idea that one should look at quantum 
measurement as a ‘complementing’ system where the reconstruction of data gives us an idea of 
the behavior, not the direct observation itself. In other words, Bohr answered the debate in a 
different way than Einstein did, though both men were aiming for the same goal: Bohr, just as 
Einstein, wanted to formulate a complete science, and therefore introduced uncertainty as 
something we had to take into account in our measurements, rather than seeing it as a problem 
that disguises a complete description. 
The discussion between Bohr and Einstein came to have a philosophical character as well 
as a physical. As such, with most philosophical debates, there is no answer key that can provide 
the 'right' answer. Therefore, their views rest upon logical arguments that should not be 
conflicting with their theories or experiments. In formulating his interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, Bohr thus took into account whatever inner conflicts there might occur, and by doing 
so he created a theory that fit the experimental results. This also led to some heavy philosophical 
consequences (Mølmer, 2010: 74). In an article from 1935, answering the EPR-paper, Bohr 
himself articulates the consequences for our understanding of physical reality: 
 
 
'We are not dealing with a mechanical influence of the examined system, but with an 
alteration of the conditions which define the possible types of predictions concerning the 
future behaviour of the system. [...] these conditions constitute an essential element in the 
description of any phenomenon to which the expression 'physical reality' can be attached 
in a consequent way' (Mølmer, 2010: 80). 
 
 
By stating this, Bohr not only says that quantum mechanics isn't a theory of where particles are 
or what they're doing, but a theory of what we expect to find when we measure particles - he also 
defines physical reality as being dependent of the observer and the experimental conditions 
Page 51 of 66 
 
(Mølmer, 2010: 80-81). As such, Einstein and Bohr differed in their understanding of quantum 
mechanics' ability to describe reality.         
    
RESPECTIVE SCIENTIFIC VIEWS 
 
Science, on both sides of the debate, is central to the disputant’s approach to the world 
and their point of departure in reaching any knowledge, but how far does this view reach and 
what can it be used for. For some, like Schrödinger, science is a tool used to interpret physical 
reality. He believed that through progress we could push the bounds of science and uncover more 
of the picture of reality. Taken further, by the likes of Bohr, science was the tool by which 
experience could be proved. Through the lens of science knowledge was built, but this was 
bound by our ability to understand and our limitations in conceptualization. For others, like 
Einstein, science was the direct path to the truth. Einstein was very concerned with how we 
construct our epistemology, and he believed that science could be a direct reflection of the 
ontological world, thus any knowledge made in science held some truth in it about reality itself. 
These views are all consequences of the scientific theories they held to be true, a dialectic 
practice of their adherence to specific theories of science effecting knowledge. 
 
GROUNDINGS OF DISAGREEMENT 
 
The main bone of contention in the whole debate seems to come down to a two part 
question, them being “what is reality, and does quantum mechanics describe it?” In regards to 
both questions we have analyzed the views presented in physics papers and other writings by 
several physicists. In addressing the first question, we can see that there are many similarities 
between the constructions created by Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger, and Heisenberg, in concern to 
their respective views on realism. While all seem to have a view that grants the independence of 
reality from our subjective experiences this doesn’t lead all of them to agree on a common view 
ontologically and epistemologically. The importance of a true, or accessible, ontological reality 
seems to be lost (or unimportant) on all but Einstein. Einstein supposes that we must be 
searching for, and experiencing to some extent, physical reality 'as it is'. The others are of the 
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mind that the ontological is well and fine left alone. Whether or not there is physical reality we 
may never know, more importantly, we must be of the mindset that this doesn’t mean that reality 
is not out there somewhere ‘as it is’, mind-independently. In this way, what becomes of true 
importance is the strive toward a full theory of physical reality. Still, it is a destination, that when 
and if we reach it, this fact we may not even realize. 
What we believe creates this difference in ontological views is how deeply the respective 
physicists allow reality to be described by quantum mechanics, and the association between the 
two questions becomes even more integrated. For Heisenberg, for instance, quantum mechanics 
is a full description of the physical world. Accepting the quantum mechanical system comes 
along with its price, that being the inherent acceptance of uncertainty, and the limitations that not 
being able to know the whole picture about any singular quantum occurrence bring with it. The 
repercussions of holding this true, as Bohr does, highlight the limitations of our own sensory 
experience; if we only see “so much” of the world, we can only describe and understand it based 
on this limitation. This affects not only that which we try to know but what we can know about 
it, thusly our epistemological view is effected as well. 
 
 
While the theories of quantum mechanics themselves are not very easy to grasp, their 
direct effect on philosophical thought is just as complex. One of the difficulties lies in 
understanding what quantum mechanics is saying, or trying to say, makes it exponentially more 
difficult for us to reduce it into meaning for our philosophical constructions. Part of the difficulty 
in understanding lies in the limits of language. Physics, and much of the math, has its own 
constructed language that draws upon the classical system of physics. Quantum mechanics itself 
uses some of the same terminology but it explains very different phenomenon. This problem can 
be ascribed to the concept of wave particle duality and the repercussions of physicists resolving 
it. How can something be both a wave and a particle?           
If quantum mechanics really does describe the world there are obvious facts that have to 
be accepted. One of them being the actual picture we are able to paint of reality. To highlight this 
we can abstract the theories of quantum mechanics to concern our macro world to some extent. 
In this regard the uncertainty principle itself has a huge effect on what we can know. If only a 
percentage of any given quantum experience can be known with certainty all of our experiences 
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come into question. Questions such as, what do we actually know or how can we know what will 
happen next become more bothersome.  
The fact that some believe us to see as complete a picture as possible doesn’t mean there 
isn’t any of the picture left see. This is why many physicists express their discord with debating 
the ontological. We are limited in such a way that no matter how complete or correct our picture 
of reality is we will never see the whole picture, we will never be able to gain perspective of how 
much of our subjective experience is actually embedded in an ontological reality. We simply 
need to come to an understanding that our reality is governed by probability, but it is still 
possible that there is a one hundred percent probable occurrence out in the true reality. It tickles 
our curiosity that there is a part of reality that we have to be content not to know fully. 
 
PROBLEMATIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE QUANTUM STATE 
 
Conceptualization is an important aspect of our understanding of phenomena. The Oxford 
dictionary describes ‘conceptualization’ as “[to] form a concept or idea of (something)” (Web 8). 
Conceptualization is thus an active process of forming an idea about anything. For example, we 
form a concept about a car or a tree, or for our purpose, a pendulum or an unobservable electron. 
The conceptualization plays on our understanding of those concepts, mainly through language 
and the way we talk about these things. If one is to be asked about what a car is, a concept of 
‘car’ should exist first in order to be able to express what a car is. We cannot compose a 
language out of nothing, but it must consist of certain preconceptions of concepts -as we later see 
as a notion being advocated by French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). 
It is thus in the way we conceptualize and imagine things that we truly understand them. 
Though conceptualizing a number or outcome of an equation asks for a certain consideration of 
how we interpret this number or formalism, or as Merleau-Ponty calls it: a “sign”, what does the 
‘outcome’ of such mathematics say about a state and our understanding of it? As we shall see, 
there is a fundamental difference, not only in the results we derive from both quantum 
mechanical equations and classical equations, but also in what defines our understanding of what 
a state is. Let us look again at the core concept of ‘state’. 
No one with a basic knowledge of physics will have problems with conceptualizing what 
a classical state is: a set of observables with definite values (px , x) (e.g. in a system with one 
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degree of freedom). We know its momentum (px) at a certain measured point (x). There is a 
direct link between the observed system’s (with one degree of freedom) momentum p and the 
numerical value we can ascribe to it - let’s say for example 5 kg m/s, and this corresponds to the 
position of x; so at x, we measure for px 5 kg m/s. This number is assigned to the momentum of 
the oscillator, for example a pendulum. One might say that the value and its unit becomes 
ascribed to the pendulum and it enables us to understand what p ‘is’ and in relation to the 
observed phenomenon. What this implies is that p serves as a direct conceptual translation of 
what the pendulum is. 
For quantum mechanics, this conceptualization works in a different way. The main 
difference being that we can no longer speak about the commuting values of (px , x), but we must 
now talk about probable values, a state of superposition, because we cannot know px and x at the 
same time according to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. As we discuss a quantum state, we 
are not looking at a given value, but a property of the system. Still it holds that one has to see this 
property as a translation of the observed phenomenon, but there is a radical difference between 
the ‘being’ in a classical state and that of a quantum state. Quantum states are not described by 
observables but as wave functions and operators. Operators within a complex network; wherein 
all of them together define the quantum system (Auyang, 1995: 64). 
Having gone over one of the core concepts of quantum mechanics, what difficulties arise 
from these operators? To begin with, the word ‘operator’ suggests an active process, a denotation 
of movement. Because we are looking at a system that is defined by having properties that are 
bound to our measurements - e.g. influence of the uncertainty principle -, we can only know such 
an operator once we interfere, thereby collapsing the wave function and dissolving the 
superposition in order to know a definite ‘value’. 
Accordingly, one might easily get lost in the mathematical concepts at work here. The 
usage of such a mathematical formalism clearly shows us that quantum mechanics is an elegantly 
composed system, but nonetheless its difficulty remains. To put it bluntly: ‘how do we make 
sense of it?’. As we talk about p and its definite value expressed in its unit according to x (the 
classical system), or, the operator as an eigenvalue (quantum system), it might come to one’s 
mind that the latter is far more difficult to conceptualize than the classical image. That is because 
the matter of ‘translation’ from the value of p to the image of an oscillating pendulum depicts a 
corresponding system in itself. An unobservable eigenvalue, or operator, is, even though the 
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word ‘operator’ seems rather simple, not as simple to translate into a comprehendible object. 
Thereby we come to the fact that a classic oscillator in the form of a pendulum, is something one 
can imagine because we can see it every day in, say, an antique clock. An unobservable atom 
asks for some more ‘imagination’. 
Thus, we have seen where the conceptual pitfalls of quantum mechanics lie. It might be 
time to get back to the question ‘how does one make sense of it?’. One answer, one might find, is 
the following: 
 
“Object, property, quantity, and relation are general concepts that constitute the 
categorical framework within which the substantive contents are acknowledged as 
descriptive of the world. […] Modern physical theories introduce radically new 
substantive concepts but maintain the continuity of the categorical framework. They do 
not overthrow general common concepts but rethink them and make them their own, 
effectively clarifying and reinforcing them” (Auyang, 1995: 12). 
 
From this point of view, it seems as if the language of science finds its sole purpose in 
elaborating and reinterpreting concepts. Being somewhat of an instrumentalist view on scientific 
formalism and mathematics, the question remains unanswered as of yet. This vision implies the 
role science plays in the development of a new language of science, but seems to say nothing 
about the fundamental process of ‘translation’ into such categorical framework. Again: ‘How 
does one make sense of it?’. How can one understand phenomena -read quantum phenomena for 
our purpose- when the only thing we have is a language of signs that is of a completely different 
description than our everyday language and conceptions about phenomena? As well, if we have 
to stick to the dictionary description of ‘conception of something’, how does one conceptualize 
an unobservable, a thing we ourselves can actually not physically perceive?  
In answering this question, we can go two ways. The first one is to respond with 
“instrumental realism” (Ihde, 2002: 46), described by post-phenomenologist Don Ihde in his 
book Bodies in Technology. This might give an option of seeing scientific instrumentation as a 
‘mediator’ that gives us a look into unobservables through detectors, thereby simply doing away 
with the question of ‘unobservables’ because we ‘see’ it in plots, statistics and calculations. 
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Though this instrumental realism does away with problems at first sight, this kind of 
“visualism” (Ihde, 2002: 46) is merely a solution at first hand that mostly seems to do away with 
the whole question of conceptualization. So the answer might lie within the second vision 
advocated by twentieth century phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. He asked himself a 
similar question regarding the use of language in his work The Prose of the World (1973):  
 
“Language contains more than just ready-made phrases and can refer to what has never 
been seen. But how could language achieve this if what is new were not composed of old 
elements already experienced […] ?” (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 3).  
 
This view brings back to life, the question of conceptualization because it dares to take stance in 
the debate surrounding that specific question. As said before: language is a process based on 
previous conceptualizations we gain through our interaction with phenomena surrounding us. 
Science tries to make this process of conceptualization, or rather ‘translation’ easier through the 
use of a formalism - as an extension of language. In this view language might take over the role 
of mediator between the mathematical formalism of the unobservable and our conceptualization 
of this formalism in our daily language. This only leaves one issue unanswered, though be a big 
one. 
 Language, and our understanding of it, is a construction that is primarily subjective, and 
therefore dependent on our frame of reference. The aim might thus be method of “formalized 
epistemology” in order to do away with problems of unclearness and unify a scientific 
framework with a framework dependent on common (or philosophical) language. Since we are 
highly depending on our current language to make sense of science and its concepts, we should 
base our method on our language (Mugur-Schächter, 2003: xv-xvii). This formalization should 
consist firstly of “explicit construction of a general system of posits; definitions, and procedures 
[…]” (Mugur-Schächter, 2003: xvi), and secondly, this formalization must keep a certain 
precision that is comparable to the degree of clearness given by a mathematical description of the 
phenomenon discussed (Mugur-Schächter, 2003: xvi). In other words: what might be a solution 
for the problem of conceptualization is to bring into being a certain method of formal standards, 
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constructed to “equip anyone with an instrument for conceptualizing […]” (Mugur-Schächter, 
2003: xvii). 
        Although surely this idea of a ‘formalized epistemology’ is a solution to a certain extent 
for the problems of conceptualization, the question remains open on how we can grasp the 
unseen. Many theorists tried to give answers by adopting a realist, anti-realist or even 
instrumentalist view of science, making sure their answers were to be found in more 
metaphysical traditions and thoughts. Without going into an ontological debate about the 
‘realness’ of the object, and more specifically the atom, the true beginning of our understanding 
of the world might not lie in our views on ontology, but rather in our understanding of language. 
We can therefore ask ourselves if mathematics is merely a conceptual framework of signs that 
enables us to ‘extend’ our common day language, or if it has to be seen as a radically different 
language, consisting of signs that describe phenomena in a completely other fashion. 
 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF QUANTUM THEORY 
 
What makes it so hard to understand quantum mechanics, deriving it from the chapter of 
conceptualization, is the framework that underpins it. Throughout this paper we've recognized 
two sides to quantum mechanics - the science and mathematical concepts, and the interpretation 
and philosophical concepts. Science itself contains its own language, partially consisting of 
mathematical formalism. The fact that we can speak of a ‘framework’ suggests that there is a 
radical difference between a framework of philosophy, and one of physics because this 
highlights a distinction between the two. How can one overcome this gap between the 
frameworks? A new language may have to be learned if one wants to construct a ‘bridge’ 
between the framework of philosophy and the framework of (quantum) science. Again the 
question becomes evident ‘how to make sense of it?’. 
        Maybe it is now time to reformulate the question: ‘can we unify the frameworks to arrive 
at a comprehensive language?’. The beauty of language is that concepts and formalism have a 
common ground, coming from our understanding of the world. Language is a dynamic system in 
itself, and because of this, we are able to evolve with it and put it into use. The frameworks of 
science and philosophy could be unified by creating a ‘formalized epistemology’ in such a way 
that the two fields become non-dichotomous; part of a single framework as it were. But in the 
Page 58 of 66 
 
work of Wittgenstein, an objection is raised in his description of ‘Language games’, which we 
can interpret as the framework we are talking about. The meaning -concept- of a thing depends 
on the language game -framework- it is used in. We can thus only understand the concept, 
‘conceptualize it’, as far as we use the concept in a particular framework. (Wittgenstein, 1953: 
161). Therefore it holds that, if one wants to say something meaningful, he has to do it in a 
particular framework. It would thus seem that mathematics is only useful for science, just as 
philosophical concepts only apply to philosophy. 
It may still be open for debate if mathematical formalism is actually an extension of our 
language. The scientist may see the mathematical formalism as an extension of our common 
language, since it seemingly is able to explain things unexplainable by our current linguistic 
concepts, which are also used in the description of classical. But the non-scientist may not 
perceive it so, since the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is dealing with complex 
conceptions, and is thus not understandable to everybody. The philosopher, for instance, could 
argue that the formalism is in fact not an extension of language, but something in need of 
translation and interpretation into common language, using philosophical concepts. 
We believe we can’t get the full understanding of quantum mechanics as long as we 
separate science and philosophy, because understanding one, necessitates the understanding of 
the other. In quantum mechanics we have science, but in order to understand this science we 
need ‘interpretation’, consisting of philosophical concepts. The difficulty lies in the two fields 
having different languages; translation from one framework into the other is not completely 
achievable because of the asymmetry of their used languages. Either, science and mathematics 
should not be separated from philosophy and its concepts but, rather, go together under a unified 
framework (e.g. a formalized epistemology), or, the scientist needs to become, also, a 
philosopher and the philosopher, also, a scientist. That is to say that in order to understand 
quantum mechanics, one needs to speak both languages. 
        Throughout the paper we have discussed philosophical theories that describe reality and 
phenomena, and we have looked into a science that is concerned with fundamental processes of 
reality. What we can see in the end is that these two frameworks boil down to the same question 
of ‘understanding’ the world that we live in, albeit both in their own fashion. Being concerned 
                                                 
1 To be found in paragraphs 6 and 7. Wittgenstein arrives at this point through examples of language games and the use of 
words. 
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with the same questions point at a potential of a harmonious compatibility, rather than a 
fragmented way of conducting science or philosophy. 
Like it once was, in those times that the philosopher was the scientist and the scientist the 
philosopher, we now again have to strive for a commuting image of the two making sense of the 
world we live in. The purpose is thus to banish reductive ‘boxed’ thinking, limiting ourselves to 
only one framework, and instead, either, building the (linguistic) bridge between these fields or 
becoming experts in both, to compatibility construct our knowledge of the world. 
Having recognized that quantum mechanics necessitates both mathematical formalism 
and philosophical concepts, we propose that this implies something for reality as well. If the 
results given by quantum mechanics needs philosophical interpretation in order to become 
'useful', then the scientist is not just a 'discoverer' that exposes reality, but a constructor as well. 
In interpreting quantum mechanics constructions about reality are made, and these come to be 
our understanding of reality. As such, reality as presented by quantum mechanics is a 
construction - not a glimpse of reality 'as it is'. This is also implied in the Copenhagen 
interpretation with the significant role of the observer and measurements. If experimental results 
depend on observance and measurement, then these are part of that construction of reality. That 
quantum mechanics is not showing us the world 'as it is' was previously implied by Bohr in 
saying that the use of imaginary numbers makes it impossible to understand the formalism 
literally. Thus, if Bohr is right, reality as we understand it is a construction based on science and 
philosophy. We don't know that Einstein would disagree with this construction since this bridges 
into the field of metaphysical realism, but his theory implies that we don't construct physical 
reality, even though we may construct our metaphysical view of reality. This is in opposition to 
Bohr, since his theory actually entails that we do, to some extent, construct physical reality, 
when interfering with quantum experiments. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
How do the interpretations of quantum mechanics in the Einstein-Bohr debate offer 
philosophical views of reality, and which conceptual problems can be said to underpin their 
philosophical disagreements? 
As mentioned in the introduction the language of quantum mechanics is the mathematical 
formalism, which is open to a variety of interpretations. We have come to conclude that the 
Einstein side of the debate regards quantum mechanics as incomplete in offering a full 
description of reality. This side holds a view of reality as a mind-independent thing, which we 
can know 'as it is'. Oppositely to this, the Bohr side of the debate sees quantum mechanics as the 
peak of science, and as the highest obtainable theory of reality. Reality exists mind-
independently, but what we can know about it is dependent on the circumstances of 
experimentation and observation, and even so we can only hope to know some of it, when we 
explore the quantum level. Thus, this side states that we have to be content with not being able to 
know everything. 
It does not seem possible for us to advocate for one view more than the other, since it all 
comes down to philosophical view of reality and what we can know about it. As previously 
mentioned the Bohr side seems to hold the strongest experimental evidence, but still it leaves 
questions unanswered. On the other hand, Einstein’s conception of reality coheres with our 
macroscopic view of reality and thus does not have the same counterintuitive elements as Bohr's 
side. 
We believe that the disagreement of the different physicists comes down to a core 
concept, it being the conception of interpretation. To say that this is the only concept at work 
would do a disservice to the nuances and dynamics that are involved in the creation of the frame 
from which one interprets the world. We see the largest shortcoming in this debate as being the 
lack of language on both sides of science and philosophy. This leads to misinterpretation or 
overextension by those involved in the debate and ultimately to disagreement. 
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In all, we can conclude that two options exists in resolving the issues highlighted by the 
debate, the main issue being the lack of cohesion in the fields of philosophy and science. The 
two options are thus, either a unified language of meaning, ‘formalized epistemology’, or, the 
unification of scientists and philosophers as bilingual practitioners and constructors of reality. 
The answer may not be as hardline as choosing one over the other, but itself may be a gradation 
or blending of both to form a new method, understanding, and application of quantum mechanics 
and reality. 
 
 
REFLECTIONS 
 
 
For us, the process of understanding quantum mechanics has been a long and intense 
process. Our role within this paper was the role of philosopher. Staying true to the vision that a 
unified framework of philosophy and science is our solution to the problem of conceptualization, 
we were ought to gain some insight in the science we were discussing throughout this paper. 
Again the emphasis is on the difficulty that lies within the translation of mathematical concepts 
into a language much more open for interpretation than that consisting of equations. 
        In hindsight, the project, of which this paper is the final result, was a learning curve in 
every aspect. Although familiarity with the philosophical concepts we have used, was certainly 
present, the understanding of the completely new language of quantum mechanics was a struggle 
that asked effort and time to master. It became clear to us, luckily in the first stages of the paper, 
that we had dived into an enormous game of debate consisting of many players, and we were to 
be found in the midst of it, relatively lost. The challenge was thus to delimit ourselves, and set up 
a definite field which we wanted to discover, explore and in the end say something meaningful 
about.  
        As said before, we were not only limited by our ability to understand quantum 
mechanics, but by our broad interest in it as well. Going over the theories that we wanted to 
apply, there is only so much we can say in a project of this length, and we made an effort to say 
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everything that is of interest to the debate, as well as to leave out everything that seemed of less 
importance. The philosophical repercussions of the quantum mechanical interpretations we have 
looked into are vast, and whole books can be written on the subject (as we saw reading through 
the literature). Though one issue remained clear to us, spontaneously leading from our own 
evolving experiences with quantum mechanics, namely the problem of ‘understanding it’. By 
now, it is safe to say that we understand some of the physics and math that govern this field of 
science, though it is to say that we, at the same time, have to be modest about how much we 
really know of it. In the end, the project turned out to be an attempt of us doing the thing we 
advocate in the discussion: bridging the gap between the framework of philosophy, and the 
framework of science, if only in ourselves. We thus feel that we can affirm the assumption made 
in our discussion, namely that understanding quantum mechanics necessitates an understanding 
of both science and philosophy.  
In retrospect, the material necessary to gain a full understanding of quantum mechanics is 
immense and can in no way be dissected by easily, if one does not have the scientific foundation. 
As such, we again refer to the usefulness of understanding the mathematical formalism before 
trying to apply a philosophical interpretation to it. Knowing now what we do, a more direct 
approach with our problem statement in mind would have been advisable, as to avoid the 
background theory we ended up providing. 
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